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Summary  
 
Nowadays, large number of open source software are being developed by the open source software 
communities and made available to the public domain. Open source software started with the 
promises for better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to predatory 
vendor lock-in. Risk free (secure) software is the key requirement for organizations planning to 
implement open source software as part of their software stack. In order to understand Open source 
software security better, this thesis offers two approaches, which can be used for testing and analyzing 
the security of open source software. 
This project was performed at Agder University in the Department of Information and 
Communication Technology. The goals of the project were to describe the various common source 
code vulnerabilities. Validate their presence in open source software using static source code analysis 
technique. And finally, develop a threat assessment model to further explore and document potential 
threats so that to be able to build a solid security strategy to guard against the threats. 
A brief introduction and background theory of open source software security is followed by the two 
approaches introduced for testing the security of open source software. These approaches are Static 
Source Code Analysis and Threat Assessment Modeling techniques. 
The practical part of the experiment consists of two steps. In the first step static source code analysis is 
performed on a test case application, using two tools namely, Flawfinder and RATS. This approach 
was chosen mainly because it is normally similar with code auditing to the extent of concentrating on 
the actual source code, but instead of auditing the code manually, it uses automated tools. The second 
step threat assessment modeling (Threat Risk Modeling) was introduced to discover the design and 
architectural vulnerabilities on the test case application that would otherwise be impossible to detect 
them using static source code analysis. For this purpose, the tool Microsoft Threat Analysis & 
Modeling tool v2.1 was used. 
A case study was performed on an open source application rdpdesk-3.2 (remote desktop connection 
manager). In this case study the application was scanned to check for the presence of source code 
related vulnerabilities using the two static source code analysis tools. After the scanning were 
performed, a threat risk model was developed for the application that was used in the detection of 
design and architectural vulnerabilities. The results of the case study led to a clear conclusion that the 
application contains large number of vulnerabilities. Moreover, the results also made clear that the 
combined use of both approaches can be used to improve the security of open source software by 
verifying the source code as well as design and architectural vulnerabilities. 
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Abstract 
 
Organizations that implement open source software in their system before they verify the software for 
security vulnerabilities are more vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, it is important to discover and fix 
vulnerabilities in open source software before their implementation. Nowadays different techniques 
exist that help in the vulnerability discovery. The goal of this project is to improve the security of open 
source software by discovering various source code vulnerabilities using static source code analysis 
technique, and design and architectural vulnerabilities by developing a threat risk model. I conducted a 
case study on a remote desktop connection manager application using two static analysis tools and one 
threat risk modeling tool. In the case study performed, I found that the static analysis tools discovered 
large number of different types of vulnerabilities on the application. I also discovered some design and 
architectural vulnerabilities using the threat risk modeling tool. The results obtained from the case 
study suggest that it is unsafe to deploy open source software in a system without first verifying it for 
vulnerabilities.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The security of a system that makes use of open source software mainly depends on the software used 
as well as the security practices followed. Nowadays, large numbers of open source software are being 
developed by the open source software communities and made available to the public domain. Open 
source software started with the promises for better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower 
cost, and an end to predatory vendor lock-in [5]. Even though the mentioned promises are very 
attractive, the issue of security must be considered seriously. This is due to the fact that open source 
software also offers equal opportunity for attackers to detect and misuse software vulnerabilities, affect 
the code by adding insecure code and distributing tainted version of the software. 
Open source software security is a measure that assures open source software system is free from 
danger or risk of attacks. Risk free software is the key requirement for organizations planning to 
implement open source software as part of their software stack, particularly if the software will play a 
major role. 
Nowadays securing organizations’ perimeter has largely been successful. As a result hackers and other 
malicious individuals have turned their attention in to attacking organizations applications. This issue 
forced organizations to focus highly on securing the application layer. However, by using embedded 
code or exploiting flaws in software, hackers gain control of company computers and get access to 
confidential information and customer records. Therefore, proper source code review must be 
performed to evaluate potential vulnerabilities of the code. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Various software security professionals [7, 8] claim that transparency makes systems more secure. This 
is true in a sense that by allowing the source code to be open everyone can access the code, therefore, 
bugs and vulnerabilities are found more quickly and thus are fixed more quickly, closing up security 
holes faster and this increases software security. Anyone who is interested in improving the software is 
also free to create a better, more secure version of the software. 
Trusting the above mentioned arguments of open source software advocates however, organizations 
might be tempted to deploy open source software before they evaluate the software for security. And 
this may pose several security challenges to the organizations unless the code is treated for security 
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vulnerabilities before it can be used. Therefore there is a demand for reviewing the software for security 
vulnerabilities, reveal and fix them before the software is used. 
 
1.2 Thesis Objective 
 
Software security is an understanding of software-induced security dangers and how to deal with them. 
The presence of vulnerabilities on software makes it so easy for attackers to target software, which can 
then exploit to violate the security. According to CERT most successful attacks result from targeting 
and exploiting known, software vulnerabilities and insecure software configurations, many of which are 
introduced during design and coding [1]. 
Therefore the main objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
1. Describe the various common source code security vulnerabilities. 
2. Validate their presence in open source software using static source code analysis technique. 
3. Develop threat assessment model to further explore and document potential threats so that to 
be able to build a solid security strategy to guard against the threats. 
 
1.3 Thesis Domain   
  
The investigation for the test case has been carried out on rdpdesk-3.2 (remote desktop connection 
manager) an open source software written in C/C++ language. Certain assumptions and facts are taken 
from the test case software; the same approaches themselves however can be applied to any kind of 
open source software. 
 
1.4 Importance of Topic 
 
These days businesses and other organizations store huge amounts of sensitive and critical data on 
their computer systems and this makes systems security vital. Also, they have moved their transactions 
online and they rely more on applications that are part of a network. If such businesses or 
organizations implement open source in to their software stack, attackers might compromise sensitive 
and critical information by exploiting some of the security vulnerabilities in the software. 
Therefore in order to highly benefit from open source software, the source code must be properly 
reviewed to uncover any vulnerability, reveal and fix them before the software is deployed. In this way, 
businesses and other users of open source software can keep their sensitive and critical information 
secure and thereby reducing the impact of losses and damages.  
Abraham Ghebrehiwet 
Page 10 of 121 
 
1.5   Related Works 
. 
There have been several significant efforts on open source code security. Azzam Mourad et al. [82] 
defined the concept of software security hardening, which allow developers and maintainers to deploy 
and harden security features and remedy present vulnerabilities and threats into existing open source 
software. They also propose a classification of the different levels at which the hardening can be 
applied and a methodology for hardening of high level security into applications based on a well-
defined security ontology. In addition to this contribution, they elaborate the methods for hardening 
security vulnerabilities found in C according to the classification they propose. Anne Immonen et al. 
[83] contributed a method which provides clear guidelines to assist integrators to perform an evaluation 
in their own software development environment. Their method assists in the technical trustworthiness 
evaluation, containing tools for reliability analysis and testing of open source components (OSC). 
Prasanth Anbalagan et al. [84] presented an analysis and classification of 43,710 vulnerabilities from 
the Open Source National Vulnerability Database and vulnerabilities for two specific products - 
Bugzilla and FEDORA. With the focus on the disclosure and exploits of security problems with 
respect to calendar time and in-service time, they investigated a unifying approach to understand 
security as a component of reliability. Guido Schryen et al. [85] presented the first comprehensive 
empirical investigation of published vulnerabilities and patches of 17 widely deployed open source and 
closed source software packages, including operating systems, database systems, web browsers, email 
clients, and office systems. Their results suggested that it is not the particular software development 
style that determines the severity of vulnerabilities and vendors’ patching behavior, but rather the 
specific application type and the policy of the particular development community, respectively. Carlos 
Ballester Lafuente [44] developed a software security guideline that can be used for evaluating methods 
and measuring security in open source projects with a high security implication such as healthcare 
applications for example, where the privacy and security are crucial factors. After applying the 
guideline, he found several vulnerabilities, like session hijacking or capturing login information on real 
time. 
Ashish Aggarwal et al. [86] described a methodology which integrates static and dynamic analysis 
approaches in a complimentary manner. The methodology they used adopts the strengths of the two 
and eliminates their weaknesses. They dealt with buffer overflow vulnerability with pointer aliasing. 
Nathaniel Ayewah et al. [54] they proposed the need to develop procedures and best practices that 
make use of static-analysis tools more effective than alternative uses of developer time, such as 
spending additional time performing manual code review or writing test cases. Through user surveys 
they concluded that findbugs answered their needs. Lucas Torri et al. [87] in their paper have surveyed 
ten different free/open source tools that perform static software analysis and evaluated their use in 
embedded software. Furthermore, they discussed possible directions to improve the use of static 
analysis tools in the embedded domain. Peng Li et al. [88] their paper focused on software 
vulnerability static analysis techniques and tools. First they discussed the commonly-used static analysis 
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techniques and tools, and compared these tools in a technical perspective, and then they analyzed the 
characteristics of the tools through the experiment, finally, combining dynamic analysis, they proposed 
an efficient software vulnerability detection method. George Chatzieleftheriou et al. and Magnus Ågren 
respectively [89, 90] they compared four open source and two commercial static analysis tools in terms 
of their effectiveness and efficiency of their detection capability. For their experiments they used C 
code. They used the obtained results for identifying the appropriate tool, in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
Alexander Ivanov [17] examined a sample set of vulnerabilities and developed a vulnerability 
classification based on common source code patterns. 
 
1.6   Research Methodology 
 
Analyzing open source software for the existence of various vulnerabilities is a curtail process that need 
to be done before deploying the software in your system. Code auditing, dynamic source code analysis, 
penetration test, static source code analysis, threat risk modeling and so forth are some of the 
techniques used for such analysis. In this thesis, static source code analysis and threat risk modeling 
techniques are used to reveal the different source code, design and architectural security flaws that exist 
in open source code software. The static source code analysis technique is mainly used for the 
identification of vulnerabilities on a test case application source code, while the threat risk modeling 
technique is used in the identification of the design and architectural vulnerabilities of the test case 
application. 
The practical experiments were done on the test case application (rdpdesk-3.2) using two static source 
code analysis tools (Flawfinder and RATS) and one threat risk modeling tool (Microsoft Threat 
Analysis & Modeling tool v2.1).  
 
1.7   Contribution of Thesis 
 
The key contribution of this paper is to develop open source software security best practices by 
combining static source code analysis and threat assessment modeling techniques. The result obtained 
from this combination will play significant role in the process of exploring and identifying source code, 
design and architectural potential threats and vulnerabilities to open source software. Finally, based on 
the identified threats and vulnerabilities, it will be easy to build a solid security strategy to guard against 
the identified threats to the software.   
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1.8   Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter 2 reviews some background theory that helps understand the remaining chapters.  Chapter 3 
describes the two research methodologies used for this project, static source code analysis and threat 
assessment modeling techniques. In Chapter 4, an experiment is performed on a test case application 
using the methodologies mentioned in chapter 3.  Chapter 5 presents a detailed description and 
analysis of the research results. Chapter 6 provides a discussion based on the results found. Finally 
chapter 7 presents conclusions of the research and recommendations for future research. Figure 1.1 
shows the thesis structure. 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis structure 
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Chapter 2 
 
Background Theory 
 
In this chapter I will present some background theory required for understanding the remaining 
chapters. 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2, I provide a short description of open source software and their security issues. 
In the security issues of open source software I give an overview of security through obscurity and 
security through peer review. 
In sections 2.3 through 2.6, I provide a short overview of software security problems followed by some 
common software attacks. And finally I summarize why software security is growing and provide some 
software security guidelines that need to be followed to have a more secure software. 
 
2.1   Brief Introduction to Open Source Software 
 
Software which is developed with the intention for which its source code is made available for use, 
study, re-use, modification, enhancement, and re-distribution by the users of that software is classified 
as open source software [2]. The development of the software relies on public collaboration and it is 
made available free. The philosophy on which Open Source is based is very similar to that of Free 
Software Foundation [3]. 
The licensing of the software permits users to use the software in a way they like. The software can be 
customized to meet specific needs of a user. Furthermore, a user can design a commercial solution 
from the software. This derived solution must be distributed to others with the source code. It is also 
required that the rights associated with the derived version should be extended to any recipient of the 
software. 
One unique characteristics of open source software is that restrictions are not placed on the use, 
modification and distribution of programs. The distribution terms must comply with the following 
criteria [4]. The most important issue to consider in connection with open source is licensing. The 
software has to be licensed as open source. There are different types of licenses [5] one can choose 
from. The condition is that the license must be approved by Open Source Initiative (OSI) [5]. 
Generally, the licensing can be categorized into two; namely the GNU GPL and the GNU LGPL. The 
major difference between the two is that the LGPL places more restrictions on the usage and 
redistribution of open source software [6].  
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2.2   Security in Open Source Software 
 
Security is an important aspect and integral part of the phases [91] of any software development. Either 
in open source or closed source software, trustworthiness solely depends on certain aspects [9] of the 
software design and development.  
Open source software security is the measure of assurance or guarantee that open source software 
system is free from vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The quality and reliability of open source 
software can be assessed by reviewing the software’s source code after it is made available to the public 
domain. This reviewing of the source code by several experts from anywhere around the world allow 
bugs to be discovered and fixed early.  
Open source advocates are of the view that when the source code of a piece of software is in the public 
domain it would be given the same peer review as it is done to theories published in a scientific 
journals. In other words, they believe that other programmers will review the code for security 
vulnerabilities, reveal and fix them. By doing so, the number of new vulnerabilities that is introduced 
and discovered in the software will decrease with time. This theory can be considered nice in the ideal 
world of open source. The reality is that, there are a variety of factors that affect security of open source 
software [10]. It is true that the source code is made available to the public. But the questions one will 
like to ask is whether anyone is reading the code, what level of competence is needed to reveal security 
vulnerabilities, etc. 
However, open source could benefits from reviewing the source code if the people reviewing it are 
really reviewing the source code with the intention of discovering vulnerabilities for the good of society. 
In that case the number of new vulnerabilities introduced and discovered in the software will decrease 
over time [10]. 
The reality is that, most of the users do not read the source code. They only run and test the software 
and once it is working they are satisfied (partly because of time constraints, etc.). The assumption is 
that someone else will do the auditing of the code and so it tends out that only the bad guys have real 
motivation to analyze it. Another issue is that developers do not have knowledge and qualification to 
analyze code for security vulnerabilities. 
The fact is that open source has made it easier for the bad guys to find vulnerabilities in software. Both 
good guys and bad guys have equal advantages when it comes to open source software [10].  
It is true that the more people review a piece of code, the less likely it is that the code will have a 
security flaw, a person who is an expert in reviewing code will be more effective than a group of people 
who are beginners. 
Another point of interest that makes the whole issue complex is that it is easy to hide vulnerabilities in 
software that is complex, little understood and there is no (or little) documentation covering the source 
code. 
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2.2.1   Security through Obscurity 
  
Open source advocates and that of closed source have different views when it comes to security. 
Whiles closed source software supporters believe that keeping the source code secret makes their 
products more secure, open source software supporters hold on to a contrary view [10]. 
Open source advocates argue that keeping the source code secret implies to “security through 
obscurity” [92]. This concept is generally criticized as ineffective in the IT community. Their point of 
view is that, keeping quiet about once possession just makes it less likely that thieves will target you. 
However it will not be sensible to leave your doors open at night just because you think that you do not 
make noise about your properties. In the same way, not making the source code open might deter 
some hackers; however the large number of successful attacks against Windows and other proprietary 
software is ample evidence that keeping the source code closed does not provide better level of 
security. 
The interesting point to note in this case is that closed source software does not have any advantage 
[92] when it comes to using source code to find vulnerabilities. This is because a talented attacker can 
use tools such as disassembler/decompiler1 to generate the assembly language of the product. From the 
above discussions one can realized that having the source code of programs hidden does not protect 
the program very much. Closed source supporters believe that a vulnerability that exists in software but 
is not discovered cannot be exploited, thus making the system secure. However, this situation can be 
likening to a time bomb2 [8]. 
 
2.2.2   Security through View of Various Experts 
 
There have been a lot of discussions in connection with open source software security. Various security 
professionals have contributed to this crucial topic. Transparency, they say makes systems more 
secure. The idea is that by allowing people to see the source code, find bugs and then make peer- 
reviewed changes in the code, the security of the software will be improved. 
According to Bruce Schneier, a computer security and cryptography expert, it is important that security 
engineers have access to the code of open source software. He said, “Demand open source code for 
anything related to security” [11]. However, not all the security professionals are in agreement with him 
[7]. 
                                               
1 Disassembler is a computer program that translates machine language into assembly language. 
2 Time bomb refers to a computer program that has been written so that it will stop functioning after a predetermined date 
or time is reached. 
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One of the experts who have a contrary view to that of open source software supporters is John Viega. 
He is co-author of Secure Programming Cookbook for C and C++. He is of view that the whole idea is 
only a type of “cultural elitism” that is coming from the open source community. 
According to him, members of open source community belief that they are better at writing code than 
anyone else. Another expert named Fred Schneider of the Department of Computer Science at 
Cornell University in New York has this to say: “There is no reason to believe that the many eyes 
inspecting [open] source code would be successful in identifying bugs that allow system security to be 
compromised.” [7]  
 
2.3   Software Security Problems 
 
Software security is a central aspect of the computer security. Software based security complication 
such as buffer overflow, integer overflow and the like continues to exist with us for decades. Too often 
attackers look for software vulnerabilities to hack into computer systems. Furthermore, with software 
ever increasing complexity and extensibility, internet-enabled software applications are easily targeted 
to attack [12, 13].  
Software security is an understanding of the impact of software-induced security risks and the act of 
tackling these risks. Good  software security practices [14] involves taking into consideration of security 
in the early stages of the software development lifecycle. This includes understanding of common 
security problems, identifying and analyzing risks and designing for security.  
There are many kinds of software vulnerabilities [15] some examples are, Lack of input validation on 
user input, Fail-open error handling, buffer overflow and so forth. Description of each problem is out 
of the scope of this thesis. However, in the following subsections I provide some common software 
vulnerabilities description. 
 
2.3.1   Buffer Overflow 
 
Buffer overflow takes place as a result of programming error that happens when a program attempts to 
put data in a memory slot beyond the bound or outside of the memory allocated for the data. The 
main consequences of writing data outside of the memory allocated includes program crash, data 
corruption and malicious code execution. 
Despite the fact that developers know what buffer overflow vulnerability is,  buffer overflow attacks 
tends to be still common in newly-developed programs [16]. Partly the problem is caused due to the 
fact that there exist a wide variety of buffer overflow [17] and partly due to erroneous techniques used 
to prevent them.  
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In a classic buffer overflow [17] exploit, an attacker inputs data to a program with an undersized stack 
buffer. The result is that data on the stack is overwritten, including the return address of the function. 
The data from the attacker sets the return address so that when the function returns, control is 
transferred to malicious code of the attacker's data. 
In C and C++ languages, many functions that manipulate memory do not perform bounds checking. 
As a result they can easily overwrite the allocated size of the buffers in which they operate. When used 
incorrectly, even bounded functions can cause vulnerabilities for example strncpy().  
There exists many real-life examples of buffer overflows, among them are popular “industrial” 
applications, such as e-mail servers (Sendmail) [18] and web servers (Microsoft IIS Server) [19]. 
Here is a piece of code that clarifies  buffer overflow: 
void test(char *s) { 
char buf[1024]; 
strcpy(buf, s); 
} 
int main(int argc, char **argv) { 
test(argv[1]); 
} 
This code is vulnerable to buffer overflow. This is true because the code has a local buffer and the 
unsafe function [20] strcpy()  that writes to memory with no bound checking. In this example argv[1] 
can be of any length, more than 1024 characters and it can be copied into the variable buf. As it is seen 
it seems simple to find a code vulnerable to buffer overflow. Using some automated tools will facilitate 
the searching for the vulnerability otherwise it can be searched by focusing on the string based 
functions like strcpy(), strcat() or gets() and then see if these functions operate on local buffer. If 
searching succeed in finding these functions there is high possibility of redirecting execution control to 
flow to anywhere you want. Another method would be trial and error that is by feeding a large input 
data to the space allocated during execution. 
Poor input validation is the main reason for Buffer overflow vulnerabilities. An attacker exploits this 
vulnerability to run his code in the victim and control the victim’s machine. So care must be taken to 
validate inputs to shut the doors that enable attackers to do their job. Here are some of the techniques 
used to prevent buffer overflow: Non-executable stack, Static Analysis, Dynamic runtime protection 
and using safer versions of functions.  
 
 
Abraham Ghebrehiwet 
Page 18 of 121 
 
2.3.2   Integer Overflow 
 
An integer overflow is another programming error that is commonly seen in programs. This  condition 
happens when a not properly sanity checked  integer is used in the determination of an offset or size 
for memory allocation, copying, concatenation, or similarly. If the integer in question is incremented 
beyond the maximum bound, it may fold to become a very small, or negative number, and thereby 
providing wrong value. 
I will illustrate this problem by taking a simple example. Let’s consider an unsigned 
char of 8-bit integer types. 
Unsigned char a = 237; 
Unsigned char b = 60; 
Unsigned char c = a+b; 
When executed the code gives the following result 
   (a)  11101101 + 
   (b)  00111100 
          ------------- 
   (c) 100101001 
The sum of the two variables a and b gives a 9-bit integer result. However, since c is an 8-bit variable, 
the left most bit is cut off from the result variable c and the result is 237 + 60 = 41 instead of 297. 
Some of the main consequences of integer overflow include; Availability, Integrity and Access control. 
For details see [21]. 
The main problem with Integer overflow is the difficulty of detection when it happened. So an 
application gets real difficult to tell if a result calculated is correct or not. This can becomes very 
serious if the calculation has to do something with the size of a buffer or array index. Generally 
speaking Integer overflow is not directly exploited. And this is because it can not directly overwrite the 
memory, but sometimes this can open the door for another bug3 “buffer overflow” which can be 
exploited by an attacker directly. Integer overflow can be prevented by using SafeInt library. For details 
on how to use SafeInt for the purpose of integer overflow prevention see [22]. 
 
2.3.3   Format String Problem 
 
Format string problem is another programming error that allows an attacker to control a function’s 
format string. This problem occurs due to; data entries from untrusted sources to an application or 
                                               
3 Bug is a fault or defect in a computer program, system, or machine. 
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data passing as arguments to the function’s format string. Format string problem was identified as 
software vulnerability in the year 1999. This problem mainly occurs in the C/C++ language [23]. The 
exploits of this problem ranges from crashing a program, reading and writing from/to the stack and 
executing intentional codes as well. The main consequences of these exploits are confidentiality4 
(information disclosure) and access control5 (execution of arbitrary code).   
To understand this problem let us see a couple of examples [24]. In the first example, an attacker will 
be able to read data from the stack and in the second, he will write data to the stack. 
Example 1: Reading data from stack 
/* read_stack.exe */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) 
{ 
if(argc > 1) 
printf(argv[1]); 
return 0; 
}  
Here the intention is to display the content that is entered by the user at the command prompt. Let’s 
see a run of the code with the input “Hello World”. 
C:\read_stack.exe “Hello World” 
The output is a string ‘Hello World’. That is what we expected from the execution of the above line. 
What if we try to run this one? 
C:\test.exe “%X %X” 
The output should be a string like this ‘%X %X’. However, this time we get ‘12ffc0 4011e5’ printed 
into the screen instead of ‘%X %X’. So what is wrong? In fact the program did what was asked to do. 
The %X specifier is meant to read the stack four bytes at a time. So the first string of the output 
0x12ffc0 is the address of the stack location while the second output string 4011e5 is the return address 
of the main() function. From this example it can be easy to understand that if a confidential data is 
stored in the stack then it is easy for an attacker to read it.    
Example 2: Writing to the stack. 
/* write_stack.exe*/ 
#include <stdio.h> 
int  main(int argc, char **argv) 
                                               
4 Confidentiality: Discretion in keeping secret information.   
5 Access control: refers to security features that control who can access resources in a system. 
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{ 
char buf[100]; 
int x; 
if(argc != 2) 
exit(1); 
x = 1; 
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, argv[1]); 
buf[sizeof buf - 1] = 0; 
printf("buffer (%d): %s\n", strlen(buf), buf); 
printf("x is %d/%#x (@ %p)\n", x, x, &x); 
return 0; 
} 
This code formats any value passed to it from the command line prompt into fixed length buffer. After 
formatting, the buffer is printed into the screen. So let’s give it a try. 
C:\write_stack.exe “Hello World” 
The output of the code is as follows: 
buffer (11): Hello World 
x is 1/0x1 (@0x804745c) 
The program formatted the string into fixed-length buffer and prints the length of the buffer and the 
content in it “Hello World”. Moreover the value of x is displayed both in decimal and hexadecimal in 
the second line. 0x804745c is the memory address where x is stored in the memory. 
Now let’s do the bad stuff and act like an attacker. We will see how to write anything into the memory. 
For this purpose, we modify the code a bit by adding the following line just before the return point.  
printf(“123456%n”, &0x804745c); 
Now let’s run the code one more time with this input: 
C:\write_stack.exe "Hello World” 
The output will be something like this: 
buffer (11): Hello World 
x is 1/0x1 (@0x804745c) 
The result is the same as before, but this time additional thing has happened. Since we knew the 
memory address of x, the piece of the printf code we added overwrote the value of x from its initial 
value 1 to 123456. Imagine what more attacks one can do. It is possible to overwrite an arbitrary 
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memory location and corrupt some useful data stored. Even it is possible to overwrite the return 
addresses and function pointers to point to some chosen address. 
To prevent format string problem, First User input passed directly to a formatting function must be 
avoided. And secondly the format strings used by an application should only be read from trusted 
sources. This ensures that attackers cannot control the path to the strings. 
 
2.4   Software Security Attacks 
 
Computers are main targets of external attacks aiming at taking control over software behavior. In 
general, such attacks make their way to programs through a communication channel as data. Once the 
attacks arrive into the program memory, they activate existing vulnerabilities. Finally, these attacks 
overturn program execution and gain control by exploiting the program flaws [25]. 
The overall effects of these attacks are the reasons for the challenges in computer security. As a result, 
many mechanisms [27] have been proposed for defending against these attacks. Such mechanisms 
include static code analysis, dynamic code analysis and the likes. 
Gray McGraw classified attacks into four basic categories [26]; configuration attacks, attacks on 
implementation defects in systems (aka bugs), attacks on design and architecture defects in systems 
(aka flaws), and attacks on confusion surrounding trust. For details on these categories see [26]. 
 
2.4.1   Buffer Overflow Attacks 
 
Buffer overflows are the most-loved exploit that hackers look for. This is mainly due to the fact that an 
attacker takes control of a program expecting user inputs by exploiting some of the program flaws. 
Generally, there exist two types of buffer overflow attacks. These are stack6-based attacks and heap7-
based attacks. This classification is according to Brien M. Posey [28]. For details on heap-based buffer 
overflow and stack-based buffer overflow see [29, 30]. 
Heap-based attacks are attacks that overflow the memory (space) reserved for a program, however, due 
to the difficulty involved in performing such an attack, this type of attacks happen rarely. On the other 
hand, stack-based buffer overflow attacks are the most common ones.  
 
 
                                               
6  A stack in computing architectures is a region of memory where data is added or removed in a last-in-first-out manner. 
7  A heap is a general term used for any memory that is allocated dynamically and randomly; i.e. out of order. 
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2.4.2   Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks 
 
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are attacking techniques which are most common in the application layer 
[32]. In these attacks, malicious scripts are injected into trusted web sites. For these types of attacks to 
occur, an attacker uses a web application to send malicious script to a different an end user, usually in 
the form of a browser side script. When a web application uses an input from a user for the output it 
generates without validating it, this condition opens a door for allowing flaws that lead to XXS attacks.  
According to Acunetix web application security, in general, cross-site scripting attack is defined as “A 
hacking technique that leverages vulnerabilities in the code of a web application to allow an attacker to 
send malicious content from an end-user and collect some type of data from the victim.” 8 
Putting it differently, when an attacker sends a malicious script to a non suspicious user, the user 
executes the script. As a result, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other 
sensitive information (including credit card numbers, social security numbers and even medical 
records) maintained by the browser and used with that site. These malicious scripts are even capable of 
rewriting the content of the HTML page.  
In general, there are two categories of XXS attacks [31]. These are stored XXS attacks and reflected 
XXS attacks. For details on stored and reflected XXS attacks go through [31]. 
 
 
           Infect with script 
 
                                                     Visit 
 
                                                 Inject script 
 
                                                                                  Do something bad 
 
Figure 2.1 High level view of XXS attack 
 
2.4.3   SQL-Injection Attacks 
 
SQL Injection attacks are other types of attacks that are most common in application layer. These 
types of attacks exploit the improper coding of web applications vulnerabilities thereby allowing 
                                               
8  “Cross-site scripting attacks”  Acunetix web application security. 
Victim Hacker Your homepage WWW 
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hackers to inject SQL commands into say a login form to allow them to gain access to the data held 
within a database. Once an SQL injection exploit is successful, an attacker can read sensitive data from 
the database, modify database by (Insert/Update/Delete) data, even he/she can execute administration 
operations on the database [33, 34].  
Website features which are susceptible to SQL Injection attacks include; login pages, support and 
product request forms, feedback forms, search pages, shopping carts and the likes. This is mainly due 
to the fact that the fields available for user input in these features allow SQL commands to query the 
database directly. 
Generally speaking, main consequences of SQL-injection attacks are; Confidentiality, Authentication9, 
Authorization10 and Integrity11 problems. Prevention mechanism for these types of attacks includes; 
input validation, binding variables, securing functions and Error messages [35].   
 
2.4.4   Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks 
 
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an attack in which an attacker attempts to make a computer or 
network resource inaccessible and prevent users from accessing information or services. For example, 
using this attack mechanism, an attacker can prevent you from checking e-mail, websites, online 
accounts (banking, etc.), or other services that run or depend on the affected computer.  
The most common and obvious type of DoS attack occurs when an attacker "floods" a network with 
external communications requests. When you type a URL for a particular website into your browser 
for example ‘www.yahoo.com’, you are requesting the site's computer server to view the page. The 
server can only process a certain number of requests at once, so if an attacker is able to overload the 
server with huge number of requests, it can't process your request. This is what "denial of service" is. 
The server rejects/denies your request because it is flooded with huge requests from the attacker.  
(US-CERT) defined some symptoms of denial-of-service attacks to include [36]: 
 Unusual slow network performance 
 Unavailability of a particular website 
 Inability to access of a website 
 Dramatic increase in the number of spam e-mails received 
 
An attacker can perform an attack on your email account by using spam e-mail messages. When you 
create an e-mail account, you are assigned a specific storage on the e-mail server of the account 
provider, this limits the amount of data you can have in your account at any given time. An attacker can 
                                               
9  Authentication is the process of determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is declared to be. 
10  Authorization is the process of giving someone permission to do or have something. 
11  Integrity is a concept of consistency of actions, values, methods, measures, principles, expectations, and outcomes. 
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consume your quota by sending many, or large, e-mail messages to the account, preventing you from 
receiving legitimate e-mail messages. 
 
2.5   Why is Software Security Problem Growing?   
 
Nowadays, as businesses and societies have increased their dependencies on computing devices for 
their daily usage, software are getting developed almost in huge numbers. As there is no such an issue 
as perfect software however, most of the computing systems are susceptible to software security 
problems. From the above statements we can see the number of software (packages) developed have 
direct influence to the growth of software security problems. But is this the only reason why software 
security problem is growing? In the following subsection we will see three trends that have large 
influence on the growth of the problem [12, 37]. 
 
2.5.1   Connectivity 
 
Thanks to the internet today it is easy to connect computers and establish communication among 
them. Due to the ease of connectivity and communication that is because access through a network 
does not require human intervention, the number of attacks and ease of these attacks has also 
increased.  This issue places software at greater danger. Lots of businesses, government sectors and 
mass people have increased their dependencies on networked communication to interact with each 
other. Sadly, as these systems are connected to the Internet, they become more susceptible to software-
based attacks from various distant sources. No need for an attacker to physically assess the system in 
order to exploit vulnerable software.   
The omnipresence of networking means that there are more software systems to attack, more attacks, 
and greater risks from poor software security practices than in the past. This will even become worse 
over time. Because poor coding and design problems will still continue to exist, the Internet is 
everywhere so the attackers are now roaring at your doorstep [37]. 
 
2.5.2   Extensibility 
 
A second trend that affects software security problem growth is system extensibility. Software 
extensibility is a system design principle in which the system is designed to include plug-in architectures 
and mechanisms for expanding/enhancing the system with future capabilities and new functionalities 
(features) without having to make greater changes to the system infrastructure. For example, Today's 
operating systems support extensibility through dynamically loadable device drivers and modules. 
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Today's applications, such as word processors, e-mail clients, spreadsheets, and Web browsers, 
support extensibility through scripting, controls, components, and applets. 
From an economic point of view, extensible systems are attractive because they provide flexible 
interfaces that can be adapted through new components. In today's businesses, it is essential that 
software be distributed as rapidly as possible in order to gain market share. However at the same time 
the businesses also require that applications provide new features with each release/patch. With an 
extensible architecture, these demands are easily satisfied by releasing the base application code early, 
and then releasing later feature extensions as needed. 
 Unfortunately, despite of the mentioned attractiveness of extensible systems, it is hard to prevent 
software vulnerabilities from been released as unwanted extensions [37]. 
 
2.5.3   Complexity 
 
A third trend that influences software security growth is the growth in the size and complexity of 
software systems. For example a computer running Windows vista and associated applications consists 
of at least 50 million lines of code12 [38], and end-user applications are becoming increasingly large and 
even more complex. When systems become this large and complex, it is unthinkable to avoid bugs. 
The figure below shows the growth in complexity of Windows (as measured in lines of code) over the 
years. The point of the graph is to show the growth rate of the lines of code over time.  
 
Figure 2.2 Windows Complexity (measured in Line of code) 
                                               
12  Line of code is a popular definition of program size. 
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According to [39], it is estimated that in 1000 lines of code there exist an average of 5 bugs. This shows 
us how the number of bugs increased over the years with the increasing size and complexity of 
software. Besides the lines of code, other factors like, whether the code is tightly integrated, the overlay 
of patches and other post-deployment fixes, and critical architectural issues have significantly affected 
complexity [38]. 
The tendency for software systems to grow very large quickly is just evident in open source systems 
compared to Windows. As a result, the problem is that more code results in more defects and, in turn, 
more security risks. 
 
2.6   Software Security Guidelines 
 
From day to day, attacks are becoming more sneaky and sophisticated. As a result, they are creating a 
complicated and dynamic risk environment for IT-based operations. Due to these issues, users’ 
concern about the software integrity, security and reliability have greatly increased.  
To deal with these users’ concerns and adhere to customer requirements, vendors and product 
providers must take substantial efforts focusing at reducing products’ vulnerabilities, enhancing attack 
resistance and protecting integrity. The efforts used to guarantee the security of the above mentioned 
concerns are often denoted as “software assurance.” Software assurance is particularly an essential 
factor for public safety and economies, critical information of organizations and national security. In 
other words these users require a high degree of software security confidence. This confidence is only 
achieved by using best practices for developing secure software [9, 14, and 41]. According to Todd 
Landry OWASP, SANS institute, MITRE, PCI Security Standards Council and SEI are the top five 
leading organizations when talking about software security guidelines. A concise overview of the top 
five leading organizations is found at [40].  
In the following subsections I provide some guidelines used to ensure software security. 
 
2.6.1   Secure the Weakest Link 
 
Viega and McGraw [42] described secure the weakest link by saying “Security practitioners often point 
out that security is a chain; and just as a chain is only as strong as the weakest link, a software security 
system is only as secure as its weakest component. Bad guys will attack the weakest parts of your system 
because they are the parts most likely to be easily broken. (Often, the weakest part of your system will 
be administrators, users or tech support people who fall prey to social engineering.)”(p, 93-96).  
Attackers have more tendencies to launch an attack by penetrating through weak sides in a software 
system than investing their time and effort to penetrate into a heavily strengthened system. For 
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example, some carefully designed cryptographic algorithms requires a great deal of time (usually years) 
to break. Attackers are not stupid, so probably they will not spent years trying to attack encrypted 
information communicated in a network. Instead, they prefer to target the termination points, could it 
be server/client or the likes, as the spot may be easier to attack.  
The weakest spot of a system can be software or sometimes it can be surrounding infrastructures 
(components) that interact with the software. Therefore it should be a common practice for software 
venders to be sure as whether the weakest links (parts) of their products are secure enough before they 
release their products to end users. Doing so plays a great deal in closing some doorsteps to attackers 
[43, 44].  
 
2.6.2   Defense in Depth 
 
In an application, layering security defenses into multiple layers play an important role in reducing the 
chance of a successful attack. Defense in depth is an organized use of layered security defense used to 
protect the integrity of the information. In other words Defense in Depth is a principle which helps in 
maintaining a secure infrastructure by adopting a layered approach, i.e. defending against various 
threats at various levels. The scheme uses the principle from military defense that it is more difficult 
for an enemy to defeat a multi-layered military defense system than to penetrate a single barrier [9, 45].  
The probability of an attack to succeed is minimized by building a well-structured Defense in depth. 
Building such a strategy also helps system administrators and security personnel to identify people who 
attempt to compromise their system. For example, if an attacker penetrates and gains access to a 
system, the system administrators will have enough time to deploy new countermeasures to prevent 
adverse impact from occurring if the system security is built based on the defense in depth strategy. 
The Defense in Depth strategy should include all the possible countermeasures that need to be taken. 
Some of the components include Antivirus software, firewalls, anti-spyware programs, hierarchical 
passwords, intrusion detection, biometric verification and the likes. In addition to the above listed 
components, physical protection of business sites along with comprehensive and ongoing personnel 
training enhances the security of critical data against compromise, theft or destruction. All in all the 
main idea of Defense in Depth is to ensure the existence of a well-designed robust defense strategy in 
shelf. A detailed discussion of the topic is found at [46]. 
 
2.6.3   Fail Securely 
 
Software or system crashes can happen any time by any means. For example attackers try to make it 
crash in order to expose several potential vulnerabilities in it during startup. So security professionals 
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and developers should design the system architecture in such a way that ensures failing securely when a 
component in a system fails. This concept is called “Fail Secure”. 
The main idea here is, when a system fails, it should fail securely not giving any footprints which an 
attacker can start with. Normally this involves things like: secure defaults, restoration to a secure state, 
always checking return values for failure, existence of a default case that does the right thing and the 
likes. Assess all stuffs that could happen during system failure and be sure that it does not threaten the 
system [42, 47, and 48]. 
 
2.6.4   Use the Least Privilege 
 
The principle of list privilege which sometimes called principle of minimal privilege is giving users or 
components the least access privilege required to accomplish its gob. In other word this is to say when 
a subject requires accessing a resource, only the lowest access rights should be assigned to it. And the 
access right shouldn’t stay long duration it should be in effect for a short period. A user with access 
right beyond the necessary right may change information in unwanted ways. Therefore, carefully 
delegated access rights play major role in limiting attackers from compromising a system. 
For example, let's say you were to go on summer vacation, and ask one of your neighbors just to collect 
mail for you. No matter how close you are with your neighbor or how much you trust them you don’t 
put yourself at risk by giving them the key to your house. Only the key to your mail box will be 
enough. So this way you your mails will be collected without your house been set to risk [49]. 
 
2.6.5   Compartmentalize 
 
Compartmentalization (multilateral) is the restricting of information flow across security levels. The 
idea is that if details of a system is kept or known to few people only, the risk probability of 
compromising that system is decreased. In information security, the concept of compartmentalization 
originated in the managing of classified information in military, intelligence agencies and the likes. 
The principle of compartmentalization are used to impose the need to know principle, that is a person 
is only allowed access to the information if it is a must to know to do his task. If the person does not 
need to know the information in order to perform his task, then compartments can be enforced to 
limit the information that person can access [39, 51].  
In compartmentalized system information-control boundaries need to be vertical as shown in figure 2.3 
rather than horizontal as it is used in the Bell-LaPadula (multilevel) model [50] figure 2.4.  
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TOP SECRET          
SECRET  A B C D 
CONFIDENTIAL          
UNCLASSIFIED    Shared Data   
 
Figure 2.3 Bell-LaPadula model                 Figure 2.4 Multilateral (compartmentalize) 
 
2.6.6   Keep it Simple 
 
Generally speaking, complex systems tend to introduce more bugs. For instance if we consider a very 
simple Web browser and start adding more and more features to it the more we add new features, the 
more complicated it gets, and the harder it is to make it secure. Naturally, complex systems (systems 
that involve software) introduce multiple risks. One such risk is that due to the extensibility or patching 
of new features or fixes, malicious functionality can be easily added to the system. Sadly, complexity of 
the system lets malicious components to remain invisible to non-suspicious users until it is too late. 
Another risk is that complexity in a system makes it hard to understand, analyze and secure it. 
According to Gray McGraw et al., it is difficult to achieve security even when the system is simple and 
complexity makes security even more difficult. Security risks can remain uncovered in complex system 
until the areas have been exploited [52]. 
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Chapter 3      
 
Research Methodology 
 
In this project two research approaches are used. The first method is static source code analysis 
technique and the second one is threat assessment modeling technique. The choice for the first 
technique is mainly because static source code analysis are normally similar with code auditing to the 
extent of concentrating on the actual source code, but instead of auditing the code manually, it uses 
automated tools. In this method, the auditing is mainly based on the use of gained knowledge and 
known issues more effectively and focuses the attention on areas of the code more likely to be 
vulnerable.  
However, despite of the above advantage, the tools used in static source code analysis method might 
sometimes generate imprecise analysis report, that is either they generate some false negatives13 or 
some false positives14. This means that the tools can hide existing vulnerabilities or sometimes they 
suggest non existing vulnerabilities on the code. Moreover, static analysis tools also have some 
limitations, especially in identifying design and architectural vulnerabilities. Therefore in order to have 
higher confidence on the security of an application, I introduced the second method, threat assessment 
modeling, to further explore and identify all possible potential threats including those that were not 
discovered using the static source code analysis tools. The developed threat model together with the 
result of the static analysis can then be used to build a solid security strategy to guard against the 
outlined threats to an application.   
 
3.1   Static Source Code Analysis Technique 
 
Software quality with respect to security is crucial. Different techniques are used to improve the quality 
of software. Static source code analysis is one of such techniques. It is the process of analyzing a 
program without executing it. Static analysis techniques are used primarily in the areas of software 
metrics, quality assurance, program understanding and refactoring [17]. Several static code analysis 
tools are developed in the recent years. With the help of these tools one can easily evaluate a program. 
Static source code analysis tools are used in the security arena for vulnerability detection. These tools 
operate by checking specific vulnerable code patterns in a program or it checks if a program control 
flow reaches some state of vulnerability. And up on finding either one of the two program flaws the 
                                               
13  False negative refers to a result that tells you a condition is not present, when in reality, is there.  
14  False positive refers to a result that tells you a condition is present, when in reality, is not there. 
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tools report for bugs. Alexander Ivanov mentioned in his paper [17] “Most tools rely on a static rule set 
of predetermined code patterns that they should detect and report.” This means that due to their 
nature, not all vulnerabilities can be detected by static analysis tools. So if a bug is not reported after an 
analysis by a tool it doesn’t mean the code is free of bug. The recommended procedure is to use 
various tools and detect as much bugs as possible. Several approaches are used to static analysis some 
of the most popular approaches are pattern matching, lexical analysis, parsing and AST analysis. For 
details on the approaches see [17]. Listed below are both the advantages and limitations of static source 
code analysis. 
Static source code analysis advantages: 
 It can find weaknesses in the code at the exact location. 
 It can be conducted by trained software assurance developers who fully understand the code. 
 It allows a quicker turn around for fixes. 
 It is relatively fast if automated tools are used. 
 Automated tools can scan the entire code base. 
 Automated tools can provide mitigation recommendations, reducing the research time. 
 It permits weaknesses to be found earlier in the development life cycle, reducing the cost to fix 
[53]. 
 
Static source code analysis limitations: 
 It is time consuming if conducted manually. 
 Automated tools do not support all programming languages. 
 Automated tools produce false positives and false negatives. 
 There are not enough trained personnel to thoroughly conduct static code analysis. 
 Automated tools can provide a false sense of security that everything is being addressed. 
 Automated tools are only as good as the rules they are using to scan with. 
 It does not find vulnerabilities introduced in the runtime environment. 
 
For further reading on static source code analysis it is recommend reading [54]. 
 
3.1.1   Pattern Matching 
 
Pattern matching is the process of examining some sequences for the presence of the same patterns. 
Pattern matching is the simplest technique used in static analysis. A common way to do code auditing is 
to use the grep utility to see the existence of the pattern ‘strcpy’. Often the function strcpy() is misused 
and existence of this function is a good indication for a potential vulnerability. However, this doesn’t 
mean that all calls to strcpy() is dangerous. Some calls could be safe. In this case, proper treatment 
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should be carried to the unsafe calls only. Pattern matching technique has some problems. These 
include: 
 Not capable to detect complicated vulnerabilities 
 May generate very large false positive results 
 Lack of proper C parser 
 Incapable of telling comments from real code 
 
3.1.2    Lexical Analysis 
 
Lexical analysis is another technique used in static source code analysis and it is the process of reading 
the characters of the source code from left to right discarding whitespaces and grouping them into 
tokens. Compared to pattern matching, lexical analysis provides slight improvement. In lexical analysis, 
the tokens developed by grouping the source code are matched against a database of known 
vulnerability patterns. This technique is used by tools like Flawfinder, RATS and ITS4 [55]. I will 
present Flawfinder and RATS in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 respectively. Lexical analysis improves the 
result of pattern matching further by handling irregular whitespace and code formatting. However, the 
number of false positives is still very high. 
 
3.1.3   Parsing and AST Analysis 
 
To further improve the performance of static source code analysis, the next step to do is parsing the 
source code and building an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). Normally this task is performed by the 
compiler and provides a possibility for code reusability. In order for a static source code analysis tool 
to parse and analyze various programs correctly, the tool’s parser must be compatible at least with one 
of the significant compilers.  
The abstract syntax tree (AST) captures only the important nodes in a tree form, while neglecting 
unnecessary syntactic details. The main distinguishing factor of ASTs from concrete syntax trees is they 
omit tree nodes that represent punctuation marks such as semi-colons to terminate statements or 
commas to separate function arguments. The abstract syntax tree (AST) allows analyzing the syntax 
and the program semantics. One of the drawbacks of lexical analysis tools is the inability to distinguish 
the difference of a variable and a vulnerable function that have the same name, but this is not a 
problem in AST. This tool can accurately distinguish the difference.  AST reveal vulnerabilities hidden 
from lexical analysis tools by expanding complicated expressions. The pattern matching approach 
discussed in section 3.1.1 can be largely improved by using matching AST trees instead of sequences 
of tokens or character [17, 56]. 
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3.1.4   Type Qualifiers 
 
Type qualifiers are qualifiers that are used to qualify types of an identifier. They give an identifier one 
of two properties. The const type qualifier defines an immutable (non-modifiable) object while volatile 
type qualifier declares a mutable (modifiable) object.  
Languages like Java, C/C++ and the likes have few number of type qualifiers [17]. Jeffrey Foster [57] 
developed a framework for type qualifiers that are used by some advanced vulnerability detection tools. 
Foster, in his work, proposed a general purpose system for adding light weight user-defined type 
qualifiers to improve the software. According to Foster this is done by annotating the source code and 
detecting type inconsistencies by type qualifier inference. Type qualifier systems possess several 
advantages [59].  
Tools like cqual [58] require only a few type qualifier notations in order to be added to a program and 
the type qualifier inference is efficient even if the programs are large. The main disadvantage of this 
approach is that it is not applicable to large numbers of vulnerabilities that can be expressed in terms of 
type inconsistencies. 
 
3.1.5   Data-flow Analysis 
 
The analysis discussed so far are good at analyzing simple vulnerabilities like format string problem. 
However, vulnerabilities like buffer overflow, integer overflow and so forth, require some more 
complicated analysis. As seen in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 respectively, such vulnerabilities arise when 
variables are assigned values larger than the buffer. Detecting such problems in a program without 
executing the program is quite hard. Data-flow analysis (technique for gathering information about the 
possible set of values calculated at various points) is another technique which is used for solving 
problems of these kinds. It solves the problem by determining the parts of the program to which a 
variable with a particular assigned value might propagate. 
 
3.1.6   Taint Analysis 
 
Taint analysis is a technique which tracks incoming data from untrusted source and marking them 
‘taint’. Normally data originating from outside should be treated as untrusted, and therefore marked 
‘tainted'. When these data are used in operations an eye is kept on, and taint flags are broadcasted to 
the result of such operations. When data marked as tainted is used in an operation, for example as 
target address in a jump, an alarm is raised and essential action is taken. An attempt made to use 
tainted data from outside sources without performing relevant action is an indication of vulnerability. 
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Results obtained from taint analysis can be very accurate; however this has an effect to the performance 
due to the fact that a lot of emulation is involved [17, 60, 61, 62]. 
 
3.2 Threat Risk Modeling Technique 
 
Threat risk modeling is a technique used to develop a model by iteratively assessing the vulnerabilities 
in an application to find those that are most dangerous and thereby creating a prioritized set of 
countermeasures to measure and contain the risks. The model developed using this technique 
provides desirable recommendations that greatly maximize and insure the protection of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability without affecting the overall functionality of the application. Normally threat 
risk modeling is developed as a collaborative process between the various organizational levels. A 
model developed without the interaction of the organizational levels can result into an inefficient 
security measure and the cost can be high too [64, 65, 68, 69].   
Threat risk modeling is used to assist management in allocating time and money that should be spent 
in order to contain the risks [63]. Threat risk analysis is divided into two types, the quantitative and the 
qualitative. The first analysis is a mathematical approach and the second is a high/medium/low 
approach. In this thesis I use the qualitative approach. 
The central areas in threat risk modeling are: 
 Identify Security Objectives 
 Survey the Application 
 Decompose Application 
 Identify Threats 
 Identify Vulnerabilities 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the steps involved in performing threat risk modeling. 
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Figure 3.1 Threat risk modeling steps 
 
3.2.1   Identify Security Objectives 
 
When deploying open source application into your system, it is best to define security objectives and 
requirements early before you integrate the application in the system. These Security objectives are 
goals and constraints that have influence to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of your data 
and other applications of the system. Defining security objectives helps to determine where to center 
your efforts and to understand the potential attackers on the application as well. Identifying security 
objectives is done iteratively by examining the application’s requirements and usage premises. 
In threat risk modeling, Identification of security objectives is the first step that one must do in order to 
protect the security of an application. Once the security objectives are defined, they can be used as the 
basis for the subsequent steps. However, this doesn’t mean that these objectives should remain static; 
they can change with time and with new situations that may arise in the process. Any changes in the 
security objectives have an influence to other security activities. As a result, you should review your 
threat risk model now and then with every change happening to the objectives.  
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To alleviate this process, the following security objectives categories can be used as a starting point:  
 Identity: check whether the application protect user identity. 
 Financial: Assess the financial loss the organization can face in remediation.  
 Reputation: Measure/estimate the loss of reputation that can happen when the application is 
abused.  
 Privacy and Regulatory: The extent of protection of user data?  
 Availability Guarantees: what is the availability requirement of the application per a Service 
Level Agreement (SLA) or similar guarantee?  
 
Such a list is an exhaustive, but it provides some knowledge about the decisions that leads into selecting 
and building security controls [12, 65].  
 
3.2.2   Survey the Application 
 
After the security objectives have been identified, the next step is to have an overview of the 
application. Surveying the application is done by analyzing the application design in order to identify 
the components, data flows, and trust boundaries of the system. In other words this step helps in the 
identification of the application's key functionality, characteristics, and clients which in turn will help in 
identifying relevant threats that will be used in the steps that follow [65]. 
Following are some points used to create an application overview: 
Draw end-to-end deployment scenario: sketch a diagram that depicts the components, structures, 
subsystems, deployment characteristics, authentication, authorization, and communication mechanisms 
of the application. 
Identify roles: identifying the roles helps to determine both things that are supposed to happen and 
things that are not supposed to happen. For example, identify who can read data, who can update data, 
who can delete data?  
Identify key usage scenarios: Identify the important features of the application. Avoid listing every use 
case. Instead, list the main ones.  
Identify technologies: list the technologies and key features of the software. Some examples include 
operating system, development language and so forth. Identifying technologies helps in focusing on 
technology-specific threats. 
Identify application security mechanisms: Identify any key points of the following; authentication, 
authorization, input-validation, cryptography and the likes.  
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3.2.3   Decompose the Application 
 
In this step, break down the application to identify trust boundaries, data flows, entry points, and exit 
points with a security impact that need to be evaluated. Generally speaking, it is easier to reveal threats 
and discover vulnerabilities when the modules of the application become more known. 
Identify trust boundaries: identifying an applications trust boundary helps focusing the analysis on 
specified areas of interest. Trust boundaries are those points where access control levels change in 
order to access resources or an entry points in applications where data passing those point are not fully 
trusted.  
Identify data flows: trace data flows through the application starting from entry to exit. This makes clear 
how the application interacts with the external system and also clarifies how internal components 
interact. 
Identify entry points: attackers use the entry point of the application to hack into the system. This point 
is intended for clients. Identify where these entry points are and the type of data they take. 
Identify exit points: these are points where the application sends data to the client or to external 
systems.  
 
3.2.4   Identify Threats 
 
In this stage, identify the threats and attacks that might compromise the security objectives of the 
application. These threats are the bad consequences that could happen to the application. Generally it 
is difficult to identify unknown threats therefore concentrate on known threats. To perform this 
process, one can use the following basic approaches [65]. 
Start with common threats and attacks: start by preparing a list of common threats and attacks and then 
apply the threat list in your application. There is a possibility that some threats are simply eliminated 
because they are not applied in your application. 
Use of question-driven approach: this helps in identifying relevant threats and attacks. For this 
approach a STRIDE model [66] can be used to ask questions that are related to the application. 
Examine the application level by level, layer by layer and feature by feature when identifying threats. 
And while performing threat identification, concentrate on areas where security mistakes are most 
frequently made. Note that, threats identified during this stage do not necessarily indicate 
vulnerabilities.  
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3.2.5    Identify Vulnerabilities 
 
In this step, review the application security clearly looking for vulnerabilities. Follow the same process 
as done while identifying threats in the previous step. However, this time sample questions presented 
must be designed in a way to help identify vulnerabilities instead of threats.  A good approach in 
identifying vulnerabilities is to examine the application layer by layer looking at every vulnerability 
categories in each layer. 
The following are some of the vulnerability categories that might help in the process of identifying 
vulnerabilities [67]: 
 Identify authentication vulnerabilities 
 Identify authorization vulnerabilities 
 Identify input and data validation vulnerabilities 
 Identify configuration management vulnerabilities 
 Identify sensitive data vulnerabilities 
 Identify session management vulnerabilities 
 Identify cryptography vulnerabilities 
 Identify parameter manipulation vulnerabilities 
 Identify exception management vulnerabilities 
 Identify auditing and logging vulnerabilities 
 
Note that, vulnerabilities are present in an application when threats exist in the application and are not 
mitigated [70]. We will shortly see mitigation strategy in section 3.2.6. 
 
3.2.6   Mitigation Strategies 
 
Now that we have identified the threats and vulnerabilities to the application and set the risks and their 
priorities, the next stage is then to develop a well ordered and cost effective mitigation strategy. As Gary 
McGraw stated, “Any suggested mitigation activities must take into account cost, time to implement, 
likelihood of success, completeness, and impact over the entire corpus of risks”[12].  This is apparent 
that a nice and expensive mitigation strategy might not take the attention of the management’s eyes. 
Moreover, implementation time is also another factor that needs to be considered. Most of all the 
impact of the strategy over the entire parts of the risks should be considered. That is the strategy must 
be applicable to all the risks of the application not only to some parts. From the point of view of a 
business context, the limiting factor for a mitigation strategy should be the level the organization can 
afford, integrate and understand. The strategy must also be able to demonstrate proper mitigation of 
the risks. Typical measurement system to consider in this strategy is cost [71].  
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Chapter 4 
 
Case Study  
 
Now that the methods or approaches for testing Open source software security have been defined, they 
need to be tested on real application. rdpdesk-3.2, Remote Desktop Connection Manager was chosen 
as a test case application, because it has a version distributed as Open Source software and among all 
the open source software explored, this application contains compiled files which are appropriate for 
the experiments. In addition, the application is developed in C/C++ language and tools like Flawfinder 
and RATS are capable of scanning software developed in C/C++.  
 
4.1  rdpdesk-3.2 (Remote Desktop Connection Manager) 
 
Remote Desktop Connection Manager is intended to coordinate RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol), 
VNC (Virtual Network Computing) and Citrix ICA (Independent Computing Architecture) 
connections to Computers which are a part of private or corporate, local or remote, virtual or real 
networks. It provides secure access over the Internet to remote networks via traffic redirection tools 
and corresponding client libraries. The application allows easy working with remote desktops and 
servers. It is distributed both as an OpenSource Edition (OSE) GPL v2 license and commercial 
proprietary licenses as the Professional Edition (Pro) [75]. The OpenSource Edition version of the 
application support both Windows 2000/XP/2003/Vista/7 and Linux while the Professional Edition 
supports Windows 2000/XP/2003/Vista/7 only. As stated earlier the OpenSource Edition is selected as 
a test case application for this task. 
The application provides the following features: 
 Manual connection/access configuration 
 Simple user authentication 
 Certificate-based authentication 
 Login-password OS based authentication 
 Automatic connection configuration based on downloading configuration files 
 RDP-based connection 
 ICA-based connection 
 VNC-based connection 
 Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration server (MS ISA Server) Support 
 Proxy / firewall traversal 
 Secure settings storage 
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In section 4.2, the application will be treated with two static analysis tools namely, Flawfinder and 
RATS (Look Appendix B for a detailed explanation of the tools). The aim of this analysis is for 
identifying vulnerabilities in the test case application source code. Then finally in section 4.3, a threat 
risk model will be developed for the application. The threat risk model is used to further explore the 
design and architectural flaws in the application. 
 
4.2   Static Source Code Analysis: rdpdesk-3.2 
 
As discussed in section 3.1 static source code analysis is the process of analyzing a program without 
executing it. Therefore in this section I will take a test case application, rdpdesk-3.2, and then perform 
static source code analysis using two scanning tools. First we will see how to perform the analysis using 
Flawfinder and next we will repeat the process using RATS. 
 
4.2.1   Analyzing rdpdesk-3.2 Using Flawfinder 
 
In this analysis the application, rdpdesk-3.2, is scanned using Flawfinder tool. To perform the 
scanning, Flawfinder must be installed in the system. Note that, Flawfinder is Linux based tool so make 
sure to install Linux [72] in the system if it is not there. The easiest way to perform the scanning is to 
save the test case application in the same folder/location with the tool’s executable file.  
After putting the test case folder in the same location with the tool’s executable file, the next step is to 
run the tool’s executable file and pass the test case folder, in our case rdpdesk-3.2, as an argument. 
Here is how you execute it: 
/home/flawfinder/flawfinder-1.27$  ./flawfinder rdpdesk-3.2 
If everything went correct the tool starts scanning the test case application and a list of the analysis 
report is displayed in the screen. Figure 4.1 shows a snapshot of a sample run of the test case 
application using the tool Flawfinder. 
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Figure 4.1 Flawfinder snapshot 
 
4.2.2   Analyzing rdpdesk-3.2 Using RATS 
 
Here, the process in section 4.1.1 is repeated but this time with a second tool RATS. To perform the 
scanning, RATS must be installed in the system. Note again, RATS is Linux based tool so make sure 
to install Linux in the system if it is not there. In order to install RATS in the system, first Expat XML 
parser [73] must be installed in the system otherwise RATS installation will not succeed. To analyze 
the test case application using RATS, I installed Expat-2.0.1. The easiest way to perform the scanning 
is to save the test case application in the same folder/location with the tool’s executable file.  
After putting the test case folder in the same location with the tool’s executable file, the next step is to 
run the tool’s executable file and pass the test case folder, in our case rdpdesk-3.2, as an argument. 
Here is how you execute it: 
/home/rats/rats-2.3$  ./rats rdpdesk-3.2 
If everything went correct the tool starts scanning the test case application and a list of the analysis 
report is displayed in the screen. Figure 4.2 shows a snapshot of a sample run of the test case 
application using the tool RATS. 
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Figure 4.2 RATS snapshot 
 
4.3   Threat Risk Model Development for rdpdesk-3.2 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2, Threat risk modeling is a technique used to develop a model by 
iteratively assessing the vulnerabilities in an application to find those that are most dangerous and 
thereby creating a prioritized set of countermeasures to measure and contain the risks. In section 3.2 
we have seen the steps required for developing a threat risk model. In this section we will apply these 
steps to our test case application in order to further secure our software. For this task I selected 
Microsoft Threat Analysis & Modeling v2.1 [74]. Figure 8 shows a snapshot of Microsoft Threat 
Analysis & Modeling tool. The main reasons for using this tool are, primarily, it is charge free and 
secondly, the tool allows anyone to produce a feature-rich threat model [74]. Along with automatically 
identifying threats, the tool can produce valuable security artifacts such as: 
 Data access control matrix 
 Component access control matrix 
 Subject-object matrix 
 Data Flow 
 Call Flow 
 Trust Flow 
 Attack Surface 
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 Focused reports 
 
Figure 4.3 Microsoft Threat Analysis & Modeling snapshot 
 
As proposed earlier, the main task of this section is to develop threat risk model for the test case 
application. The model is developed by iteratively assessing the threats and vulnerabilities in the 
application and finally finding those that are most dangerous to the application. The developed model 
helps to create a prioritized set of countermeasures to measure and contain the risks. Developing 
threat model using Microsoft Threat Analysis & Modeling tool is a three-phase process. First phase is 
defining application context. Second phase is modeling threats on top of the application context. And 
the third phase is measuring the risk associated with each threat. We start our task with the initial stage, 
identifying security objectives. 
 
4.3.1   Identify Security Objectives 
 
The first step in the development of threat risk model is identifying security objectives. Here we create 
a list of security objectives that provides an understanding about the decisions that leads into selecting 
and building security controls of our test case application rdpdesk-3.2.  
In this task, the following configuration is used. We have a central server where several applications are 
installed there. rdpdesk-3.2 is installed on clients’ machines and it allows them to establish connection 
with the central server via a network (internet). For example, instead of deploying databases or 
accounting software or new patches on all clients’ machines, the applications can simply be installed on 
the server and clients can log on and use them via the network. This simplifies upgrading, 
Abraham Ghebrehiwet 
Page 44 of 121 
 
troubleshooting, and software management constraints. Figure 8 shows one such usage configuration of 
rdpdesk-3.2. 
The main security objectives of the application include: 
 Protection of user accounts and passwords 
 Protection of all data transmission between clients and server 
 Prevention of unauthorized users from connecting to the system 
 Prevention of authorized users from changing privilege levels 
 Ensure application availability 
 
 
Figure 4.4 rdpdesk-3.2 usage configuration 
 
4.3.2   Survey the Application  
 
The application is a remote desktop connection manager which enables clients to connect to a central 
server. The server has several applications installed in it. The application enables the clients do 
everything on the server from their own computer provided that they have logged on and have 
appropriate privileges.  
 
Application Roles  
The test case application has the following user roles. 
 Administrator 
 Client 
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Figure 4.5 user roles 
 
Figure 4.6 Data 
Application Key Scenarios 
 The key scenarios of the test case application are listed below. 
 Clients log on to connect to the server 
 Authenticated clients browse through the server 
 Authenticated clients download file from the server 
 Authenticated clients can install software to the server if they have sufficient privilege 
 Administrator logs on to the server/clients’ machine 
 Administrator creates user account 
 Administrator deletes user account 
 Administrator deletes file from client machine 
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 Administrator modify file in the clients’ machine 
 Administrator installs software in the server 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Application use cases 
 
Application technologies 
The application uses and supports the following technologies and features: 
 Programming language C/C++ 
 Operating system: windows7 
 Database server: Microsoft SQL server 2008 
 Data encryption: RSA Security RC4 cipher 
 Connections: Citrix ICA, Microsoft Windows terminal services (RDP), VNC. 
 
Application security mechanisms 
The most important known application security mechanisms of the test case software are: 
 Clients can be authenticated using simple user authentication. 
 Clients can be authenticated on the basis of certificate-based authentication. 
 Administration can be done remotely. 
 Clients can be authenticated based on windows based authentication. 
 Roles are used to authorize access privileges. 
 Application supports Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration server (MS ISA server). 
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 Client application supports firewalls and proxies for Internet connection. 
 Application uses RSA Security RC4 cipher to encrypt the data. 
 
4.3.3   Application Decomposition 
 
At this stage, the test case application is broken down to identify trust boundaries, data flows, entry 
points, and exit points with a security impact that need to be evaluated.  
Trust boundaries 
Listed below are the identified trust boundaries. 
 The boundary line firewall 
 The database server trusts calls from the application 
 The data access part trusts the application to pass valid data 
Data flows 
The applications’ data flows under RDP connection setting are: 
1. A client submits group name, server name, user name, password, and domain name through 
the rdpdesk-3.2 connection setting window. The connection information is handled by the user 
database module. This module forwards the data to the access component, which verifies the 
credentials with the database to determine their validity. 
2.  A client generates an input message (keyboard or mouse), the information is captured by the 
RDP client and it is encoded as RDP data. The data is then sent to the server. When the 
Server device driver receives the input data, it decodes it. And finally the actual mouse and 
keyboard input is sent to the Win32 kernel in the user's session address space, where it is 
processed as normal input. Figure 4.8 shows RDP graphical data flow between the client and 
the server. 
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Figure 4.8 RDP graphical data flow between the client and the server 
3. A client session uses a special RDP display driver responsible for receiving display commands 
from the GDI and passing the information to the kernel-mode Terminal Server device driver. 
This driver encodes the input as RDP data and sends it to the transport layer to be sent to the 
client. When the client receives the data, the RDP data is decoded and the display updated 
accordingly. Figure 10 shows RDP mouse or keyboard data flow between the client and the 
server.  
 
Figure 4.9 RDP mouse or keyboard data flow between the client and the server 
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4. An administrator logs on and accesses the accounts administration database. The account 
administration component checks the user role. If the user is authorized, the account 
administration component interacts with the data access component to view and modify user 
account. 
 
Entry Points 
These points are the main entrance points intended for clients to enter into the application. At this 
point I identify where these entry points are in the application and the type of data they take. 
The following are some of the identified entry points. 
 Port to be used for RDP session connection request is port 3389. 
 Port to be used for ICA session connection request is port 1494. 
 The connection setting windows which is available for the clients to create RDP connection. 
 The connection setting windows which is available for the clients to create ICA connection. 
 All other ports are restricted by the firewall unless use custom port option is selected by the 
clients. 
 
Exit points 
These points are where the application sends back data to the clients or external systems. For the test 
case application, I identify where these exit points are. 
The following are some of the exit points identified in the application: 
 The connection setting page, where the application notifies the client about the connection 
status (connected or not connected). 
 The remote system panel that shows the remote connected server. 
 
4.3.4   Identify Threats 
 
Now that the application is decomposed, the next process in the threat risk modeling development is 
to identify the threats and attacks that might compromise the security objectives of the application. 
Since it is difficult to identify unknown threats, I concentrate on known threats. Listed below are some 
of the common know threats to the application. 
 Information that is not intended to be public is disclosed  
 A dictionary attack is used to guess a password by trying all of the password in a list or a 
dictionary 
 A Brute force used to guess a password 
 A Denial of Service is used to interrupt normal operation 
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 Man in the Middle (MiM) attack is used. That is an attacker impersonate a server and the 
clients try to create connection with the attacker unknowingly. As a result the attacker gets the 
client credentials and then he is able to use these credentials to connect to the real server. 
 An attacker obtains the encryption keys used to encrypt sensitive data by acting as MiM. 
 Cross-site scripting XSS occurs by injecting script codes. 
 SQL injection occurs, an attacker exploits an input validation vulnerability to execute 
commands in the database and thereby access or modify data. 
 An attacker or a client gets unauthorized access to server resources. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Application Threats 
 
4.3.5   Identify Vulnerabilities 
 
This step is the final step in the development of threat risk modeling. It is the stage where the 
application’s vulnerabilities are identified. A good approach in identifying vulnerabilities is to examine 
the application looking at every vulnerability categories at each layer. The same procedure as the threat 
identification is used here except that now the target is identifying vulnerabilities rather than threats. 
Therefore the following vulnerabilities are some of the identified vulnerabilities. 
 Users’ account password storage.  
 Deficiency of password complexity enforcement.  
 Missing or weak input validation at the server.  
 Lack of password retries.   
 Improper encoding of output leading to potential cross-site scripting issues. 
 Disclosing exception details to clients. 
 Weak encryption keys used to encrypt sensitive data. 
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Note that a comprehensive threat risk model report for the application (generated using the tool 
Microsoft Threat Analysis & Modeling v2.1) is found in Appendix C.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Research Result 
 
Generally speaking, detecting vulnerabilities in an application is a vital process, but just as vital is being 
able to estimate the associated risk of the detected vulnerabilities to the organization. Estimating the 
impact of the risk is not an easy process unless the threats are ranked according to their risk ratings. 
Therefore once the vulnerabilities in the application are identified using any tools available, the next 
task is to rank them based on the value of their risk rating. With the use of the chosen static analysis 
tools, this is not a problem as the tools are capable of ranking the identified vulnerabilities in the 
application. However, the vulnerabilities identified using the threat risk model should be ranked by the 
analyst in order to help in the decisions of prioritizing risk mitigation. 
This chapter starts with an explanation of the vulnerabilities generated using the static analysis tools.  
Finally, the vulnerabilities obtained from the threat risk modeling technique are further classified into 
several ranks (high, medium and the likes) based upon their risk ratings. As mentioned earlier, these 
ranks will be useful in identifying the risks that need to be prioritized during mitigation time. 
Remember that not all vulnerabilities are worth of mitigating. That is some vulnerabilities are difficult 
to be exploited by attackers. Therefore investing extra money to mitigate these flaws is of nothing 
importance. 
In this task, for estimating the severity (risk rank) of the risks on the organization, the OWASP risk 
rating methodology is used. The ease of customization to the needs of the organizations is the primary 
reason for the choice of the aforementioned ranking method. A brief description of OWASP Risk 
Rating Methodology will be given later on this same chapter.  
 
5.1 Flawfinder Report Analysis 
 
The first static analysis experiment was carried out using flawfinder. The tool is designed for Unix and 
Linux platform However, with the proper installation of Cygwin it can be used in windows platform 
too. In my experiment I used Ubuntu 11.10.  The experiment was done on test case application 
rdpdesk-3.2. The application contains 933 files and 314986 Source Lines Of Codes (SLOC).  
The experiment generated 12,003 lines of report.  By analyzing the report, it was found that the tool 
detected 3167 vulnerabilities on the application. All these vulnerabilities fall into five levels, 5 being the 
most dangerous and 1 the least dangerous. After carefully studying the report, 26 out of the 3167 
vulnerabilities were found to be of level 5, 591 vulnerabilities of level 4, 86 vulnerabilities of level 3, 
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1700 vulnerabilities of level 2 and 764 vulnerabilities of level 1.  As far as the type of vulnerabilities 
concerned, the tool detected 10 types of vulnerabilities.  
As shown in Table 5.1, 2781(87.81%) of the detected vulnerabilities are of the type buffer overflow. 
These flaws happen when functions that do not perform bound checking are used. Therefore, it is 
advisable to use functions that limit length, or ensure that the size of array is larger than the maximum 
possible length.  
From the table it is clear that race condition [78] should be giving high focus as it contains 22 (84.6%) 
out of the 26 critical vulnerabilities. And vulnerabilities of this type can occur when read and write 
commands of a large amount of data are received relatively at the same time. As a result, the machine 
tries to overwrite some or all of the old data while that old data is still being read. The main 
consequences of this are system crash, illegal operation, reading and writing errors, and so forth. 
Serialization of memory or storage access can prevent such problem. That is if read and write are 
received at the same time, the read command is by default executed and completed first and then 
execution continues on the write command. 
In the application 1 port vulnerability is detected. It is of level 1 severity. Vulnerabilities of such types 
are not problem by themselves, however they open door to buffer overflow. This vulnerability 
happened due to incorrect implementation of the snprintf function. Proper checking should be done 
during installation to avoid the problem. 
 
SN Vulnerability type Number of 
vulnerabilities 
detected 
Severity of detected vulnerabilities 
5 4 3 2 1 
1 Buffer overflow 2781 4 461 29 1534 753 
2 Format String overflow 95 0 95 0 0 0 
3 Integer overflow 64 0 0 0 64 0 
4 Race condition 38 22 14 1 1 0 
5 Random number 25 0 0 25 0 0 
6 Access 7 0 0 0 0 7 
7 Port 1 0 0 0 0 1 
8 Obsolete 3 0 0 0 0 3 
9 Shell 18 0 16 2 0 0 
10 Misc 135 0 5 29 101 0 
 
Table 5.1 Flawfinder report analysis 
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 Figure 5.1 Flawfinder report 
 
In the following paragraphs we will take a look on a snippet of the error causing codes for each of the 
vulnerability types identified in the test case application. And the proposed solution to these errors 
follows it. Table 5.2 shows description of the impact of the vulnerabilities detected using Flawfinder 
and their solution. 
 
Buffer overflow: 87.8% of the total vulnerabilities of the application are of the type buffer overflow. 
This error is initiated when a function attempts to copy into the memory without performing bounds 
check. Vulnerabilities of such type can overwrite the memory or read sensitive data from the memory 
if exploited by an attacker. As an example we will see a snippet code of such vulnerability that was 
found in the test case application. 
1   hostname = (char *) xalloc ( 
2   strlen (ciptr->transptr->TransName) + strlen (addr) + 2); 
3   strcpy (hostname, ciptr->transptr->TransName); 
4   strcat (hostname, "/"); 
5   if (addr) 
6   strcat (hostname, addr); 
7   return (hostname);  
In line 2 the function call strlen is banned string length function. This function should be replaced with 
either String*Length or strnlen_s. this error is most problematic for critical applications, such as those 
accepting anonymous Internet connections. These problems can result to system crash. 
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In line 3 the function strcpy results in buffer overflow vulnerability this is because the functions copies 
the content of ciptr->transptr->TransName to hostname without performing bound check. This 
vulnerability can overwrite the memory. And if it is exploited by an attacker it gives the attacker a 
chance to run malicious code. Possible solution is to avoid using the function strcpy instead replace it 
with String*Copy or String*CopyEx or strcpy_s. These are the safe versions of strcpy. 
In lines 4 and 6 we have a function call strcat. This is a string concatenating function and it can cause 
buffer overflow if it is misused. Therefore, using String*Cat or String*CatEx or strcat_s is the safe way. 
 
Format string overflow: this type of vulnerability comprises ~3% of the total vulnerabilities on the 
application. These vulnerabilities are not dangerous by themselves however they can be the reason for 
buffer overflow. Format string overflow is caused from use of unchecked user input as a format string 
parameter. Problem of this type can cause crashing of a program or execution of harmful code. Let’s 
see at a vulnerable code snippet from our application. 
#  else 
    len = sprintf(buf, format, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, 
                a9, a10, a11, a12, a13, a14, a15, a16, a17, a18, a19, a20); 
#  endif 
The function call sprintf is a banned version. This function accepts formatting string parameters from a 
user without check it. At the worst case, an attacker may use the %s and %x format tokens to read data 
from the stack or possibly other locations in memory. One way to solve this problem is to use the 
safest versions of this function call, String*Printf or String*PrintfEx sprintf_s. 
 
Integer overflow: these vulnerabilities accounts for ~2% of the total vulnerabilities in the application. 
The main problem with this type of vulnerability is that it is difficult to detect. These vulnerabilities are 
not exploited directly, however any result obtained from them which has something to do with the 
memory can cause buffer overflow. Here follows a snippet of the vulnerable code from the test case 
application. 
1   if(++i < argc) 
2   defaultPointerControl.num = atoi(argv[i]); 
3   else 
4   UseMsg(); 
In line 2, atoi is a function that converts string to integer, unless checked, the resulting number can 
exceed the expected range.  If source untrusted, check both minimum and maximum, even if the input 
had no minus sign (large numbers can roll over into negative number; consider saving to an unsigned 
value if that is intended).  
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Race condition: this accounts for ~1.2% of the total vulnerabilities in the application. Details are 
provided earlier some paragraphs above. A snippet code of this type looks like this; 
if ((fp = fopen(fname,"w")) == NULL) return 1; 
chmod(fname, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); 
S_IRUSR read permission bit for the owner of the file. On many systems this bit is 0400 and 
S_IWUSR writes permission bit for the owner of the file usually this bit is 0200. [79]. if an attacker can 
move those files, a race condition results. Therefore, it is preferable to use fchmod() instead. 
 
Random number: these vulnerabilities account for 0.7%. These vulnerabilities arise when a less 
secure random number is generated using a random value generating function. This code is taken 
from the test case application. 
char random; 
for (int i = 0; i < 256; i ++) 
   { 
      random = (char)(rand() % 256); 
      random ^= (lt*(i+1) % 128); 
      base_key.Append(random); 
   } 
The function rand() is not sufficiently random for security-related functions such as key and nonce 
creation. The proposed solution is to use a more secure technique for acquiring random values. 
 
Access, Port, Obsolete: these types of vulnerabilities were identified to be of low numbers and low 
level of severity. Combined together they accounted for 0.34% of the total vulnerabilities in the 
application. 
 
Shell: 0.56% of the total vulnerabilities on the application are of the type shell vulnerably. These 
vulnerabilities could allow execution of remote codes. If an attacker successfully exploited this 
vulnerability, he could gain the same user rights as the local user. The possible solution of this is to try 
using a library call that implements the same functionality if available. Here is a snippet of the 
vulnerable code from the tested application. 
fp = popen (aout, "r"); 
if (fp == NULL) 
abort (); 
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Vulnerability Type Impact on Organization Possible solutions 
Buffer overflow - overwrite memory 
- read sensitive data from  
the memory 
- system crash 
Use of safe functions. That is 
avoid the use of banned 
functions. 
Format string overflow - overwrite memory 
- read sensitive data from  
the memory 
- system crash 
Use of safe functions. That is 
avoid the use of banned 
functions. 
Integer overflow  
Same as buffer overflow 
- Use unsigned integer 
instead of signed. 
- Use SafeInt technique 
Race condition - system crash 
- illegal operation 
- reading and writing 
errors 
Serialization of memory or 
storage access. 
Random number Cryptographic key break Use a more secure random 
number. 
Shell Gain access rights Use of library call which 
implements same functionality. 
 
Table 5.2 Impacts and solutions of the vulnerabilities detected using Flawfinder 
 
5.2 RATS Report Analysis 
 
The next experiment was carried out using another static analysis tool called RATS. This is because it 
is always better to use several tools in order to detect as much vulnerability as possible. RATS is 
designed for Unix, Linux and windows platforms. The experiment was done on test case application 
rdpdesk-3.2. The application contains 933 files and the total lines analyzed are 320036 lines.  
The tool detected 1282 vulnerabilities on the application. 782 that is ~61% of the total vulnerabilities 
are of the type buffer overflow and 336 (26.21%) are of the type format string overflow. The rest of the 
vulnerabilities added together account for ~12%. 87.13% of the vulnerabilities are of high severity 
while 12.87% are of medium severity. The vulnerabilities detected fall into 10 vulnerability types.  
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As shown in table 5.3 RATS detected some vulnerabilities such as Exception throw, DNS-forgery, 
Time Of Check Time Of Use (TOCTOU) and Trojan horse insertion that were not detected using 
Flawfinder. However, the tool didn’t detect any integer overflow vulnerabilities on the test case 
application.  
 
S/N Vulnerability type Number of 
vulnerabilities 
detected 
Severity of detected 
vulnerabilities 
High Medium Low 
1 Buffer overflow 782 709 73 0 
2 Format String overflow 336 336 0 0 
3 Integer overflow 0 0 0 0 
4 Input validation  34 34 0 0 
5 Exception throw 6 6 0 0 
6 Race condition 40 0 40 0 
7 Random Number 35 0 35 0 
8 DNS-forgery 15 15 0 0 
9 Trojan horse insertion 11 11 0 0 
10 Time Of Check Time Of Use 
TOCTOU 
23 0 23 0 
 
Table 5.3 RATS report analysis 
 
 
Figure 5.2 RATS report 
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Following are some explanation of the detected vulnerabilities on the application with a snippet of the 
vulnerable codes. Table 5.4 shows description of the impact of the vulnerabilities detected using RATS 
and their solution. 
Buffer overflow: 
        
  
 
 
 
     
 FILE *fp;   }    
     int i, ch;         strcpy(passwdFile, argv[1]); 
 char passwd[16];         read_from_stdin = 0;  
          make_directory = 0;  
          check_strictly = 0;  
        }    
        
 Code snippet A,   Code snippet B,   
        
        
In A the variable passwd is initialized to an array of 16 characters. This is vulnerable to buffer overflow. 
If unsafe functions are used to copy data to this variable, then there is high probability of buffer 
overflow. For example an attacker might send more than 16 characters to the passwd variable and 
overwrite the memory. In B the idea is to copy the second argument that passed from the command 
line to the variable passwdFile. However, due to the use of the unsafe function strcpy, buffer overflow 
can result if the value passed from the command line exceeded the length of the variable passwdFile. 
Successfully exploitation of such vulnerabilities might result in system crash, sensitive data reading from 
memory, writing to memory, and execution of malicious code. The main solutions to this type of 
vulnerability are use of safe functions as well as extra care should be taken to ensure that character 
arrays that are allocated on the stack are used safely. 
 
Format String overflow: 
if (m_pDSMPlugin->IsEnabled()) 
 { 
   char szMess[255]; 
   memset(szMess, 0, 255); 
   sprintf(szMess, "--- Ultr@VNC Viewer + %s-v%s", 
     m_pDSMPlugin->GetPluginName(), 
     m_pDSMPlugin->GetPluginVersion() 
     ); 
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   strcat(m_desktopName, szMess); 
In this piece of code we see the unsafe function call strcat in the last line. The idea here is to 
concatenate two values m_desktopName and szMess. However, if argument2 copy more data than can 
be handled, it might open door for buffer overflow. Therefore the solution is to use a safer version 
strcat_s. 
 
Input validation: 
fp = popen (aout, "r"); 
  if (fp == NULL) 
abort (); 
 
Solution Argument 1 to this function call should be checked to ensure that it does not come from an 
untrusted source without first verifying that it contains nothing dangerous. 
 
DNS forgery: 
gethostname(hname, 1024); 
 host = gethostbyname(hname); 
 if (host == NULL) 
     hnameptr = hname; 
 else 
     hnameptr = host->h_name; 
The gethostbyname function in the above piece of code returns information (ip) about the host named 
hname. If the lookup fails, it returns a null pointer. This function call is vulnerable because the DNS 
result obtained can’t be trusted. This is because DNS results can easily be forged by an attacker (or 
arbitrarily set to large values, etc), and should not be trusted. If an attacker can send DNS responses to 
a vulnerable system, he can easily cause a denial of service, crashing the application that made calls to a 
vulnerable resolver library. It is hard to execute arbitrary code using this vulnerability. However, 
information disclosure is possible if a vulnerable system returns the contents of memory adjacent to a 
DNS response. In another way if exploited, this vulnerability could also be used to gain root access to 
the system. One solution is to use maximum buffer size. 
 
Trojan horse insertion: 
           m_hZipDll = LoadLibrary(szDllFn); 
   if ( m_hZipDll == NULL ) 
   { 
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    CHAR   szWinDir[ MAX_PATH ] = ""; 
    ::GetWindowsDirectory( szWinDir, sizeof( szWinDir ) ); 
    if ( ::strlen( szWinDir ) ) 
    { 
     char  cLastChr = szWinDir[ ::strlen( szWinDir ) - 1 ]; 
     if ( cLastChr != '\\' && cLastChr != '/' ) 
      ::strcat( szWinDir, "\\" ); 
     ::strcat( szWinDir, ZIP_DLL_NAME ); 
     m_hZipDll = LoadLibrary( szWinDir ); 
    } 
   } 
The function LoadLibrary in the above piece of code loads the module named szDllFn into the 
address space of the calling process. However, if m_hZipDll is null that is szDllFn does not exist, the 
function loads szWinDir. The function LoadLibray() searches all places for a library, if no path is 
specified this might allow a Trojan to be inserted somewhere. The solution to this problem is to specify 
the full path of the library. 
 
Time Of Check Time Of Use TOCTOU: 
TOCTOU is another type of vulnerability that is caused by changes in a system between the checking 
of a condition and the use of the results of that check. As seen from the race condition vulnerability 
earlier, TOCTOU is a kind of race condition.  The following code is a snippet of a vulnerable code 
that was taken from the test case application.    
            struct stat buf; 
 static time_t lastmod = 0; 
 int ret = stat(SecurityPolicyFile , &buf); 
 if ( (ret == 0) && (buf.st_mtime > lastmod) ) 
 { 
     ErrorF("reloading property rules\n"); 
     SecurityFreePropertyAccessList(); 
     SecurityLoadPropertyAccessList(); 
     lastmod = buf.st_mtime; 
 } 
The stat() function obtain information about the file SecurityPolicyFile and write it to the area pointed  
to by the buf argument. If successfully completed, 0 is returned. Otherwise, -1 is returned.  
The stat() call is a check call. If it is followed by a use call, it can be lead to TOCTOU vulnerability. 
One solution to this problem is to flag the call to the stat() if the first argument (dir name) is used later 
in use-category [80]. Another solution is to use safer functions such as, lstat(), fstat() and open(). 
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Vulnerability Type Impact on Organization Possible solutions 
Buffer overflow - overwrite memory 
- read sensitive data from  
the memory 
- system crash 
Use of safe functions. That is 
avoid use of banned functions. 
Format string overflow - overwrite memory 
- read sensitive data from  
the memory 
- system crash 
Use of safe functions. That is 
avoid use of banned functions. 
Input validation - Malicious code 
execution 
- System crash 
Check function call properly 
to insure that it does not come 
from an untrusted source. 
DNS-forgery - Denial-of-Service 
- Information disclosure 
- Gain root access 
Use of maximum buffer size 
Trojan horse insertion - Steal information 
- System crash 
- Denial-of-Service 
- File modification 
- Keystroke logging and 
etc. 
specify the full path of the 
library 
Time Of Check Time Of Use 
TOCTOU 
Same as race condition - flag the call to the stat() 
if the first argument 
(dir name) is used later 
in use-category 
- Use safer functions 
such as, lstat(), fstat() 
and open(). 
 
Table 5.4 Impacts and solutions of the vulnerabilities detected using RATS 
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5.3 Risk ranking  
 
In sections 5.1 and 5.2 we have seen the different types of vulnerabilities and their severity level which 
were detected on the test case application using the static analysis tools. The primary advantage of 
organizing vulnerabilities based on their severity level is that it helps us in making decisions on which 
class of vulnerabilities to focus during the mitigation process.   
Up to this point, we have uncovered the vulnerabilities and their severities on the application’s source 
code using the static analysis tools. Based on the analysis report from the tools, the impact of the 
detected vulnerabilities and their possible solutions were described.  
In section 4.2, we have identified the Application design and architectural threats and vulnerabilities 
using the threat risk modeling approach. Therefore it is important to estimate the associated risk of the 
detected vulnerabilities to the organization in order to be able to differentiate those of high risk and 
those that have no impact or of little impact to the organization. As mentioned earlier, for estimating 
the severity (risk rank) of the risks on the organization I choose the OWASP Risk Rating 
Methodology. But first, as I promised earlier in the beginning of this chapter, I am going to provide a 
brief description of the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology. 
 
5.3.1   OWASP Risk Ranking Methodology 
 
The OWASP risk rating methodology is based on the standard risk model formula given by:  
                                     Risk = likelihood × impact 
To determine the risk ranking, the OWASP risk rating approach undergoes a six step process. These 
steps are as follows: 
Step 1: Identifying a Risk  
Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood  
Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact  
Step 4: Determining Severity of the Risk  
Step 5: Deciding What to Fix  
Step 6: Customizing Your Risk Rating Model  
However, in this task we will use only the first five steps. 
 
Step 1: Identifying a Risk 
This step involves collection of information about the threat agents involved, the attacks used by the 
threat agents, the vulnerabilities involved, and the impact of a successful exploit. 
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Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood 
This is an approximate measure of how likely a particular vulnerability can be discovered and 
exploited by an attacker. Threat agent and vulnerability are some of the factors that can help in 
determining the estimation of likelihood. 
Note that each factor has a set of options which have a likelihood rating from 0 to 9 associated with 
them. [81] 
 
Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact 
Basically, there exist two kinds of impacts. One is "technical impact" on the application, the data used, 
and its functionality. The second is the "business impact". 
Note again each factor has a set of options which have an impact rating from 0 to 9 associated with 
them.  
 
Step 4: Determining Severity of the Risk 
This step deals with calculating the severity of a risk based on the likelihood estimate and the impact 
estimate from step 2 and 3. The major thing to do here is to figure out whether the likelihood and 
impact are LOW, MEDIUM, or HIGH based on table 5.5. 
 
Likelihood and Impact Levels 
0 to <3 LOW 
3 to <6 MEDIUM 
6 to 9 HIGH 
                         
                     Table 5.5 Likelihood and Impact severities 
 
Overall risk severity 
 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
 
                    Table 5.6 Overall risk severity 
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Step 5: Deciding What to Fix 
As now the risks to the application are classified, a prioritized list of what to fix is at hand. The most 
severe risks are fixed first. When performing the fixes, take into consideration cost as well as 
reputation damage.  
 
5.3.2   Risk ranking of the Vulnerabilities Generated Using Threat 
Risk Modeling Technique 
 
In section 4.2, several application design and architectural vulnerabilities were detected using threat 
risk modeling technique. Now the task is to determine the ranks of these vulnerabilities. The detected 
vulnerabilities are listed below: 
 Users’ account password storage.  
 Deficiency of password complexity enforcement.  
 Missing or weak input validation at the server.  
 Lack of password retries limit.   
 Improper encoding of output leading to potential cross-site scripting issues. 
 Disclosing exception details to clients. 
 Weak encryption keys used to encrypt sensitive data. 
 
Let’s start determining the ranks of the above vulnerabilities. We start with users’ account password 
storage. 
 
Users’ account password storage 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detection 
9 4 4 2  9 5 6 3 
4.75  5.75 
Overall likelihood = 5.25 (MEDIUM) 
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Technical impact  Business impact 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
9 9 1 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 6.5 (HIGH)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
 
From the above calculation the overall likelihood is (MEDIUM), the overall technical impact is 
(HIGH) and the overall business impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore based on table 6, from a technical 
prospective, it appears that the overall severity is HIGH and from a business prospective, the overall 
severity is MEDIUM. 
 
Deficiency of password complexity enforcement 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detection 
9 4 7 9  9 5 6 3 
7.25  5.75 
Overall likelihood = 6.5 HIGH) 
 
Technical impact  Business impact 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
9 9 9 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 8.5 (HIGH)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
 
The overall likelihood is (HIGH), the overall technical impact is (HIGH) and the overall business 
impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore based on table 6, from a technical prospective, it appears that the 
overall severity is CRITICAL and from a business prospective, the overall severity is MEDIUM. 
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Missing or weak input validation at the server 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion detection 
6 4 7 2  9 3 6 9 
4.75  6.75 
Overall likelihood = 5.75 (MEDIUM) 
 
Technical impact  Business impact 
11 
 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
7 7 9 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 7.5 (HIGH)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
 
The overall likelihood is (MEDIUM), the overall technical impact is (HIGH) and the overall business 
impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore using table 6, from a technical prospective, it appears that the overall 
severity is HIGH and from a business prospective, the overall severity is MEDIUM. 
 
Lack of password retries limit 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detection 
1 1 7 9  3 5 6 3 
4.5  4.25 
Overall likelihood = 4.375 (MEDIUM) 
 
Technical impact  Business impact 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
9 9 9 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 8.5 (HIGH)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
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The overall likelihood is (MEDIUM), the overall technical impact is (HIGH) and the overall business 
impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore using table 6, from a technical prospective, it appears that the overall 
severity is HIGH and from a business prospective, the overall severity is MEDIUM. 
 
Improper encoding of output 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion detection 
9 4 7 2  9 3 6 3 
5.5  5.25 
Overall likelihood = 5.375 (MEDIUM) 
 
Technical impact  Business impact 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
7 7 1 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 5.5 (MEDIUM)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
 
The overall likelihood is (MEDIUM), the overall technical impact is (MEDIUM) and the overall 
business impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore using table 6, from a technical prospective, it appears that 
the overall severity is MEDIUM and from a business prospective, the overall severity is MEDIUM. 
 
Disclosing exception details to clients 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detection 
9 4 7 2  7 3 6 3 
5.5  4.75 
Overall likelihood = 5.125 (MEDIUM) 
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Technical impact  Business impact 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
9 9 9 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 8.5 (HIGH)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
 
The overall likelihood is (MEDIUM), the overall technical impact is (HIGH) and the overall business 
impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore using table 6, from a technical prospective, it appears that the overall 
severity is HIGH and from a business prospective, the overall severity is MEDIUM. 
 
Weak encryption keys 
Threat agent factors  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detection 
9 4 7 2  9 3 6 3 
5.5  5.25 
Overall likelihood = 5.375 (MEDIUM) 
 
Technical impact  Business impact 
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
7 7 1 7  3 1 5 5 
Overall technical impact = 5.5 (MEDIUM)  Overall business impact = 3.5 (MEDIUM) 
 
The overall likelihood is (MEDIUM), the overall technical impact is (MEDIUM) and the overall 
business impact is (MEDIUM). Therefore using table 6, from a technical prospective, it appears that 
the overall severity is MEDIUM and from a business prospective, the overall severity is MEDIUM. 
 
Now that we have found the severity of each of the identified vulnerabilities, it is easy to make a 
decision on what to fix first. The identified severities play major role in the making of decisions during 
mitigation process. Table 5.7 summarizes the identified vulnerabilities, their corresponding severities, 
their impact on the organization and possible solutions. 
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Vulnerability type 
 
Severity 
 
Impact on the 
organization 
 
Possible 
solutions Technical 
(prospective) 
Business 
(prospective) 
Account storage HIGH MEDIUM If location or storage of 
passwords is not secure, 
password file can be 
compromised. 
Store password 
file in a secured 
location/storage
. 
Deficiency of 
password 
complexity 
CRITICAL MEDIUM Easy passwords can 
easily be guessed 
Use complex 
passwords 
Weak input 
validation 
HIGH MEDIUM If exploited, it can 
result in format string 
overflow attacks 
Make sure 
inputs are 
properly 
validated 
Lack of password 
retries limit 
HIGH MEDIUM Guessing of account 
passwords 
Limit password 
retry max. to 
three trial 
Improper encoding 
of output 
MEDIUM MEDIUM Read/Write of sensitive 
information 
Insure that 
proper output  
encoding is 
done 
Disclosing exception 
details 
HIGH MEDIUM If exploited, it can 
result in buffer overflow 
attack 
Make sure the 
exception 
details doesn’t 
provide detailed 
information 
Weak encryption 
keys 
MEDIUM MEDIUM Information disclosure Use of strong 
(secure) keys 
 
Table 5.7 Severities, Impacts and solutions of the vulnerabilities detected threat risk modeling  
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Chapter 6 
 
Discussion  
 
As stated in section 1.1, it is claimed that, transparency makes systems more secure. That is 
vulnerabilities are found and fixed more quickly if the source code of an application is open to 
everyone, closing up security holes faster and this can increases software security. Anyone who is 
interested in improving the software is also free to create a better, more secure version of the software.  
Trusting the above arguments of open source software advocates however, organizations might be 
tempted to deploy open source software before they evaluate the software for the presence of 
vulnerabilities. This may pose several security challenges to the organizations unless the software is 
evaluated for security vulnerabilities. 
In sections 5.1 and 5.2, the results obtained using static source code analysis tools showed that the test 
case application, rdpdesk-3.2, contains large number of source code vulnerabilities. The results 
showed that flawfinder and RATS detected 3167 and 1282 vulnerabilities respectively. Of the total 
vulnerabilities detected using flawfinder, 87.81% were of the type buffer overflow, ~3% of the type 
format string overflow, and 2.02% of the type integer overflow. Race condition, random number and 
etc were the remaining ~8%. From the 1282 vulnerabilities detected with RATS, 61% were buffer 
overflow, 26.2% format string overflow, and 0% integer overflow. Race condition, random number, 
DNS forgery and etc. accounted for the rest ~13%. It is clear that if any of these vulnerabilities are 
exploited by an attacker, they can cause a serious damage (such as exposure of sensitive data, execution 
of malicious code etc.) to the organization using the application. As seen above, the static source code 
analysis tools detected large amount of vulnerabilities both in number and type wises. However, due to 
the limit in the number of rule sets defined, the tools still have some limitations on the types of 
vulnerabilities they can detect. For instance, RATS detected DNS-forgery, Trojan horse insertion and 
Time Of Check Time Of Use (TOCTOU) types of vulnerabilities on the test case application where 
flawfinder was not able to address them. On the other hand, flawfinder detected integer overflow, 
some shell and port related vulnerabilities that were not covered by RATS.  More importantly, the 
tools are only capable of addressing flaws on the source codes. This happens because they are mainly 
designed for code reviewing. Despite of the individual limitation of the static source code analysis tools 
in analyzing all types of vulnerabilities however, I believe the combined results obtained from the these 
tools play an important role at improving the security of an application by evaluating the source code 
vulnerabilities. An important issue, especially to build a solid security strategy requires identification of 
all possible threats and vulnerabilities on an application. These include design and architectural 
vulnerabilities as well. 
From the threat risk model developed in section 5.3, several design and architectural vulnerabilities 
were discovered in the application. Even though the method was exhaustive, the threat risk model 
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developed played a great role in the identification of design and architectural flaws that could not be 
addressed by the static source code analysis tools. For instance, lack of password retry limits and 
disclosing of exception details are some among the rest of the vulnerabilities that were addressed using 
the threat risk model developed. Note that, if some of the identified threats or vulnerabilities are found 
to be mitigated during the design or implementation stage, they can be easily omitted from the list of 
identified vulnerabilities. In this way, the threat risk model can be used to focus on the most dangerous 
vulnerabilities in a more efficient way.  
Static source code analysis plays a major role in the detection of source code vulnerabilities of an 
application with short time as well as low costs (including some free of charge). The use of Threat risk 
modeling, on the other hand, is an interesting approach that can be used to explore and identify design 
and architectural vulnerabilities of an application. The combined use of both approaches can be used 
to improve the security of open source application by verifying the source code as well as design and 
architectural vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The two approaches – static analysis and threat risk modeling play significant role in the detection of 
software security vulnerabilities. The combined result of both approaches can improve the security of 
an open source application by detecting source code vulnerabilities as well as design and architectural 
vulnerabilities. Static analysis is used in the detection of source code based vulnerabilities whereas 
threat risk modeling is used for addressing the design and architectural flaws in an application by 
iteratively assessing the application. In this project, I have tried to use both approaches on a test case 
open source application, rdpdesk-3.2, to improve its security level.  
The result obtained from the use of the two static analysis tools, flawfinder and RATS, showed that the 
tools detected varied types of vulnerabilities on the application. This happens because the tools are 
programmed to detect different rule sets. On the other hand, using Microsoft Threat Analysis & 
Modeling v2.1.2 several design and architectural flaws were detected on the test case application. This 
approach was used to address the structural vulnerabilities that would otherwise have been impossible 
to detect them using the static analysis approach. 
Therefore, organizations that deploy open source software on their software stack can benefit greatly 
by adopting the security best practices used in this project.  
Static analysis tools are not precise that is they generate some false positives and false negatives. Further 
work could be done on the identification of these false positives and false negatives and omit them 
from the results in order to have precise static analysis results and focus on mitigating existing 
vulnerabilities instead of wasting resources on non-existent vulnerabilities. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A       Glossary and Abbreviations 
 
Glossary 
Analysis - this process as a method of studying the nature of something or of determining its essential 
features and their relations. 
Argument - an element to which an operation, function, predicate, etc, applies, esp the independent 
variable of a function. 
Attack - any attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make 
unauthorized use of an asset. 
Buffer overflow - What happens when you try to store more data in a buffer than it can handle. 
Bug - an error or fault, as in a machine or system, esp in a computer or computer program.  
Closed source - intellectual property, esp computer source code, that is not made available to 
Compiler - a computer program that translates a program written in a high-level language into another 
language, usually machine language. Compare interpreter. 
Data - a single piece of information, as a fact, statistic, or code; an item of data. 
Error - a deviation from accuracy or correctness; a mistake. 
Execute - to carry out; complete; perform; do: to execute an order. 
Expert - a person who has special skill or knowledge in some particular field. 
Exploit - to take advantage of (a person, situation, etc), esp unethically or unjustly for one's own ends. 
Firewall - an integrated collection of security measures designed to prevent unauthorized electronic 
access to a networked computer system. 
Flaw - a defect impairing legal soundness or validity. 
Insider - a person with access to exclusive information. 
IT - the development, implementation, and maintenance of computer hardware and software systems 
to organize and communicate information electronically. 
License - permission to do or not to do something. 
Malicious - motivated by wrongful, vicious, or mischievous purposes. 
Memory - a part of a computer in which information is stored for immediate use by the central 
processing unit. 
Open source - pertaining to or denoting software whose source code is available freely. 
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Operating system – a collection of software that directs a computer's operations, controlling and 
scheduling the execution of other programs, and managing storage, input/output, and communication 
resources. 
Operator - A symbol used as a function, with infix syntax if it has two arguments (e.g. "+") or prefix 
syntax if it has only one (e.g. Boolean NOT). Many languages use operators for built-in functions such 
as arithmetic and logic. 
Parameter - a variable that must be given a specific value during the execution of a program or of a 
procedure within a program. 
Peer review - evaluation of a person's work or performance by a group of people. 
Programming - the act or process of writing a computer program. 
Public domain - able to be discussed and examined freely by the general public. 
Secret - kept from the knowledge of any but the initiated or privileged: a secret password. 
Security - something that secures or makes safe; protection; defense. 
Software - the programs used to direct the operation of a computer, as well as 
Source Code - program instructions that must be translated by a compiler, interpreter, or assembler 
into object code before execution. 
Stack - an area in a computer memory for temporary storage. 
Technical - belonging or pertaining to an art, science, or the like: technical skill.  
Threat - an indication or warning of probable trouble. 
Time bomb - A subspecies of logic bomb that is triggered by reaching some preset time, either once or 
periodically. 
Tool - anything used as a means of performing an operation or achieving a result. 
Upgrade - a new version, improved model. 
Vulnerability - open to moral attack, criticism, temptation, etc.: an argument vulnerable to refutation. 
Worm - a program that duplicates itself many times in a network and prevents its destruction. 
It often carries a logic bomb or virus. 
 
List of Abbreviations  
AST                                     Abstract Syntax Tree 
CERT                                  Computer Emergency Response Team 
DNS                                    Domain Name Server 
DoS                                     Denial-of-Service 
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GDI                                    Graphics Device Interface  
GPL                                    General Public License  
HTML                                Hyper Text Markup Language 
ICA                                     Independent Computing Architecture 
IT                                        Information Technology 
IIS                                       Internet Information Services 
LGPL                                  Lesser General Public License 
MiM                                    Man in the Middle  
MITRE                               Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Research And Engineering 
MS ISA                               Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration 
OS                                       Operating System 
OSC                                    Open Source Components 
OSE                                    Open Source Edition  
OSI                                     Open Source Initiative  
OWASP                                 Open Web Application Security Project 
PCI                                      Peripheral Component Interconnect 
RATS                                  Rough Auditing Tool for Security 
RC4                                     Ron's Code4 (RSA Variable-Key-Size Encryption Algorithm - Ron Rivest) 
RDP                                    Remote Desktop Protocol 
RSA                                     Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 
SANS                                  System Administration Networking and Security 
SEI                                      Software Engineering Institute 
SLA                                     Service Level Agreement 
SLOC                                  Source Lines Of Codes 
SQL                                     Structured Query Language 
STRIDE                              Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,  
                                            Denial-of-Service, Elevation of  Privilege. 
TOCTOU                           Time Of Check Time Of Use 
URL                                    Uniform Resource Locator 
VNC                                    Virtual Network Computing 
XSS                                     Cross Site Scripting 
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Appendix B      System setups 
 
Flawfinder 
 
1. Install Linux/Ubuntu  
2. Download flawfinder to your system by opening a terminal window and executing the following 
command; 
sudo apt-get install flawfinder 
3. Unpack the software; 
      tar –xvsf flawfinder-*.tar  ;  where * is the version of the software. 
4. After unpacking it change directory to flawfinder-*. 
     cd /path/to/flawfinder-* 
5. Install the software by issuing the following command 
      make install 
6. After the software is installed, issue the following command to start the scanning; 
     ./flawfinder /path/to/target-folder 
If you want save the analysis result in a text file, issue the following command; 
./flawfinder /path/to/target-folder >> file-name.txt 
 
RATS 
 
The setup for using RATS however requires installation of expat in your system in order for RATS to 
be installed successfully. 
1. Download expat-2.0.1.tar from; 
      http://sourceforge.net/projects/expat/ 
2. Unpack the software; 
      tar –xvsf expat-2.0.1.tar   
3. After unpacking it change directory to expat-2.0.1. 
     cd /path/to/ expat-2.0.1  
4. Finally install expat by issuing the following command; 
     make install 
5. Download rats-2.3.tar.gz to your system from; 
           https://www.fortify.com/ssa-elements/threat-intelligence/rats.html 
6. Unpack the software; 
      tar –xvsf rats-2.3.tar.gz   
7. After unpacking it change directory to rats-2.3.tar.gz. 
     cd /path/to/rats-2.3.tar.gz 
8. Install the software by issuing the following command 
      make install 
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9. After the software is installed, issue the following command to start the scanning; 
     ./rats /path/to/target-folder 
If you want save the analysis result in a text file, issue the following command; 
./rats /path/to/target-folder >> file-name.txt 
 
 
Appendix C      Static source code analysis tools used for the experiment 
 
1.  Flawfinder 
 
Flawfinder is an open source program that scans source code in order to detect possible security 
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities detected are organized according to risk level. 
Flawfinder is a very useful tool that can be used to quickly find and get rid of some vulnerability before 
a program is released to the public for use. 
The tool functions on Unix as well as Linux systems. One can decide to port it to be used on windows 
systems. This analyzing tool needs Python 1.5 or a greater version to run. 
Flawfinder was written to boost the use of static source code analyzers to find security vulnerabilities in 
programs. The program is made available under General Public License (GPL) version 2, hence it is 
open source software as defined by the Open Source Definition. 
Flawfinder Functions 
The tool contains a built-in database of C/C++ functions with well-known security problems such as 
buffer overflow risks, format string problems, race conditions and poor random number acquisition. 
Some of the buffer overflow risks in the database are: strcpy(), strcat(), gets(), sprintf(), and that of 
format string problems are : printf(), snprintf(), and syslog(). The race conditions problems are: 
access(), chown(), chgrp(), chmod(), tmpfile(), tmpnam(), tempnam(), and 
mktemp(), whiles random() is a poor random number acquisition problem. 
The tool works by using the database and the good aspect is that the database comes with the analysis 
tool. The tool takes the source code text and performs matching with the database problems. However 
text inside comments and strings are ignored. 
Flawfinder is aware of gettext; a common library for international programs. Hence it treats constant 
strings passed through gettext as if they were constant strings. This approach helps to lessen the false 
hits in international programs. 
The list of potential security flaws produced by the tool is called “hits”, and they are organized 
according to the risk level; the riskiest are placed at the top of the list. The risk level is not only 
determined by the function, but also the value of the parameters of the function. 
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For instance, constant strings are considered less risky than fully variable strings in many situations. 
Sometimes, Flawfinder determines that a particular construct is not risk, thus reducing false positives. 
The tool gives better information and prioritization other than just running test on the source code. It 
has the capability to ignore comments and the insides of strings as well as analyze parameters to 
determine the risk levels. However, this does mean that Flawfinder is a perfect tool. It does have the 
knowledge of data types of function parameters and does not do data flow analysis. 
Actually, not all the problems that can be detected using this tool are security vulnerabilities and it is 
also true that not all vulnerabilities can be detected using Flawfinder. Moreover, the tool does not really 
understand the semantics of codes. What it does is to carry out simple text pattern matching whiles it 
ignores comments and strings. This notwithstanding, Flawfinder as a static analysis tool can be very 
useful in locating and removing vulnerabilities in software. 
Reviewing of Patches 
When there is a need to review only a set of changes that were made to a program instead of the 
reviewing the whole program, one can still use Flawfinder to do that. If the changes made are confined 
to a section of the code, the review can be done manually, otherwise it is difficult. There is an added 
automated support in Flawfinder 1.27 that enables it to review only the changes in the program. 
In order to do this, one has to first create a “Unified Diff” [76] file and compare the older version to 
the current version. This is followed by running Flawfinder on the newer version and that give it “--
patch (-P)” [76] option that points to the patch file. 
This will work since Flawfinder will perform its function. However, it will only detect hits that are in the 
patch file. The tool functions by reading the unified diff file in order to detect the files that have been 
changed and the lines that have changed in the code. Precisely, it uses 
"Index:" or "+++" lines to ascertain the files have been changed. The tool then uses the line numbers in 
"@@" regions to find out the chunk line number ranges, and it then uses the initial +, -, and space after 
that to determine which lines really have changed. 
One of the challenges in this case has to do with statements that span more than one line. The 
statement might begin from one line and extend to another line. A change on the second line 
introduces vulnerability on the second line. Flawfinder deals with this situation by displaying security 
vulnerabilities that are reported one line before or after any line that has changed. 
This seems to be acceptable compromise. However, the problem is that Flawfinder will not detect if 
the code enforcing security requirement is deleted since it does not have the capability to do that. 
Hit Density 
Hit density is the number hits per thousand lines of the source code. It is a useful relative indicator of 
the likelihood of security vulnerabilities in source codes. This is one of the metrics used by Flawfinder 
in reporting vulnerabilities. 
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The security level of two source codes can be determined by comparing their hit density levels. This 
can be done by running Flawfinder test on the two source codes to determine the hit densities of the 
two. The one with a higher hit density is the one with a worse security record even if none or few of the 
cases reported were actually security problems. 
High hit density in a program is an indicator that the programmer used very dangerous construct which 
are difficult to use in the right way and that most often than not lead to vulnerabilities. The hits might 
not necessarily be vulnerabilities but the fact is that programmers who continuously use such constructs 
are likely to make mistakes to create conditions for vulnerabilities. 
When comparing two source codes, it is necessary to take the sizes into consideration. This is because 
a program with a smaller size will have a higher hit density when compared with a much larger size 
program. In this case, one cannot conclude that the code with a larger size is more secure. This is in 
view of the fact that density is a fraction and size is the denominator. 
However, it is easier to assess programs that are smaller; therefore, it is likely that such programs can 
be reviewed directly in order to detect vulnerabilities. 
 
2. RATS 
 
The word RATS is an acronym for Rough Auditing Tool for Security. This open source analyzing tool 
was developed by Secure Software security engineers. The company was acquired by Fortify Software, 
Inc. RATS as a static analysis tool can be used to scan source codes written in C, C++, Perl, PHP and 
Python. The results of the scan highlights common security related programming errors such as buffer 
overflows and TOCTOU race conditions. 
Using RATS to scan source code produces result that list potential trouble spots on which a security 
analyst needs to focus. The result also gives a description of the problem and potentially suggested 
remedies. It also shows a relative assessment of the potential severity of each of the problem captured 
in the result. This helps in analyzing the result of the scan. One of the good features of RATS is that it 
performs some basic analysis to rule out conditions that are obviously not problems. 
The tool does not have the capability to find every error. It also detects other problems that are not 
vulnerabilities. In fact it only performs a rough analysis of source code. Therefore manual inspection 
of code is still necessary, but the process is greatly improved with the use of this tool. 
RATS static analysis tool is free software, thus it can be copied, distributed, and modified as permitted 
by the terms of the GNU Public License. The latest edition that was released is version 2.3. 
In order to use RATS, one needs to install expat. It is often installed in /usr/local/lib and 
/usr/local/include. However, there is a need to specify --with-expat-lib and --with-expatinclude options 
to configure on some systems, so that it can find the installation of the library and header. 
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One can simply run make in the distribution's top-level directory to build the program after the 
configuration script has finished successfully. Once this has been done and the tool installed correctly, 
it can be used to scan source codes.  
RATS is used in the command line mode and it accepts few command line options as described 
below. The tool also accepts a list of files to scan on the command line. In case no files to scan have 
been specified, it will use “stdin”. 
The command options that be used on the command line of this static analysis tool are: rats 
[-d ] [-h] [i] [l] [-r] [-w ] [-x] [file1 file2 ... fileN]. 
The command options have different functions as explained below: 
Rats [-d ] command option specifies a vulnerability database to be loaded. There may be multiple -d 
options and each of these databases that is specified will be loaded. 
Rats [-h] command option will display a brief summary of the usage. 
Rats[-i] command option will cause a list of used function calls which accept external input to be 
displayed after the vulnerability report has been generated. 
Rats [-l] option command specifies the language to be used irrespective of the filename extension. The 
valid language names that are currently used are: "c", "perl", "php" and "python". 
Rats [-r ] command option will cause references to vulnerable function calls that are not being used as 
calls themselves to be generated. 
Rats [-w ] command option will set the warning level. The valid warning levels are 1, 2 or 3. 
Level 1 includes only default and high severity. Level 2 means medium severity. Level 2 is the default 
warning and level 3 indicates low severity vulnerabilities. 
Rats [-x ] command option will cause the tool not to load the default vulnerability databases (which are 
in the installation data directory, /usr/local/lib by default). 
The tool is not difficult to operate. When it is started, it scans each file that is specified on the 
command line and then produces a report when it has finished scanning the source code. The types of 
vulnerabilities that are reported in the final report depend on the data in the vulnerability database or 
databases that are loaded and the warning level that is in use. 
The output of the analysis is not difficult to understand. For each of the vulnerabilities that are 
captured in the report, a list of files and the line numbers of the code where the vulnerability occurred 
is given. To make analysis of the result easy, a brief description of the vulnerabilities and suggested 
actions are provided. [77] 
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Appendix D    rdpdesk-3.2 Threat risk Model 
 
Business Objectives | Roles | Components | External Dependencies | Data | Application Use Cases | 
Confidentiality Threats | Integrity Threats | Availability Threats 
 
Threat Model Information 
Name  Rdpdesk-3.2 Threat Model 
Description This is a threat risk model that was developed for a test case application rdpdesk-3.2 
 
Business Objectives 
 
The business objectives define the objectives behind the implementation of the system. These objectives are supported by 
use cases.  
 
Business Objectives 
 
Roles 
 
Roles define the privilege levels users have. They are logical groups of users who use the application, and can perform the 
necessary functions defined by the application. These groups are then divided into two sub groups, User Roles and Service 
Roles. User Roles contain users who interact with the application. Service Roles contain users under which services are 
executed.  
 
User Roles 
Name Description Auth. Mechanism # of Identities 
Administrator    
Client    
 
Service Roles 
Name Description Auth. Mechanism # of Identities
C/C++ Role    
Windows7 Role    
Microsoft SQL server 2008 Role    
RSA Security RC4 cipher Role    
Microsoft Windows terminal services (RDP) Role    
Citrix ICA Role    
VNC Role    
 
Components 
 
Components define the high level building blocks of the system. Components are decomposed logically into services and 
objects through which the user interacts with the system. Both components and objects can talk to each other in order to 
fulfill a user action.  
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Components 
Name Roles Type Tech. Type Run As 
Microsoft SQL server 2008    Microsoft SQL server 2008 Service Account  
RSA Security RC4 cipher    RSA Security RC4 cipher Service Account  
Microsoft Windows terminal services (RDP)    Microsoft Windows terminal services (RDP) Service Account
Citrix ICA    Citrix ICA Service Account  
VNC    VNC Service Account  
 
External Dependencies 
 
External dependency is a type of component which is external to the application and application does not have control over 
the behavior or the implementation of the dependency.  
 
External Dependencies 
Name Description Dependency Type 
 
Data 
 
Data can be logically broken down into data elements grouped based on the classification. Data is actively stored in one or 
more components which can be accessed by the user.  
 
Data 
Name Description Data Elements Data Classification Data Stores 
User Account     
 
Access Control 
Role Access Control Condition    
Administrator  C R U D     
Client    U      
 
Logging Response     
 
Access Control 
Role Access Control Condition    
Administrator  C R U D     
Client   R       
 
Message     
 
Access Control 
Role Access Control Condition    
Administrator  C R U D     
Client   R       
 
software     
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Access Control 
Role Access Control Condition    
Administrator  C R U D     
Client   R       
 
 
Application Use Cases 
 
Use cases are fulfilled by a sequence of calls. Each use case is targeted towards a specific business objective. Each call 
captures the user's action on a component. Each use case achieves a net data effect on a data.  
 
Application Use Cases 
Name Description Roles Net Data Effect 
Administrator Create User Account  Administrator C User Account 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Insert  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Read User Account  Administrator R User Account 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Select  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator, Client Update User Account  Administrator U User Account 
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Client 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Update  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
Client Update  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Delete User Account  Administrator D User Account 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Drop/Delete  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Create Logging Response  Administrator C Logging Response 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Response  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
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Administrator, Client Read Logging Response  Administrator Client R Logging Response 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator read  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
Client read  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Update Logging Response  Administrator U Logging Response 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Update  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
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Administrator Delete Logging Response  Administrator D Logging Response 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Delete  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Create Message  Administrator C Message 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator create  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator, Client Read Message  Administrator Client R Message 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
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Administrator read  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
Client read  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Update Message  Administrator U Message 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator update  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Delete Message  Administrator D Message 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Delete  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
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Administrator Create software  Administrator C software 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Install  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator, Client Read software  Administrator Client R software 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator download  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
Client download  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
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Administrator Update software  Administrator U software 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator Update  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
 
 
Administrator Delete software  Administrator D software 
 
Calls 
Caller Action Component Authorization 
Administrator uninstall  Microsoft SQL server 2008 Delegate Caller  
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Threats 
 
A threat is defined as an undesired event, a potential occurrence, often best described as an effect that might damage or 
compromise an asset or objective. It may or may not be malicious in nature.  
 
Confidentiality Threats 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Insert> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Select> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
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One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
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SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Drop/Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Response> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
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Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
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Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <create> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
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Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
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Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Install> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
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SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <download> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <download> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
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HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Unauthorized disclosure of <uninstall> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
 
Integrity Threats 
Illegal execution of <Insert> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
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Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Select> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
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SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Drop/Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Response> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
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HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
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Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <create> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
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Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
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Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
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SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Install> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <download> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <download> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
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HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Illegal execution of <uninstall> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator>  
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
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Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
 
Availability Threats 
Ineffective execution of <Insert> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Select> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
Abraham Ghebrehiwet 
Page 109 of 121 
 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Drop/Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
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HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Response> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
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Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
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Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <create> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Abraham Ghebrehiwet 
Page 113 of 121 
 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <read> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
Abraham Ghebrehiwet 
Page 114 of 121 
 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Delete> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Install> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <download> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
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HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <download> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Client> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <Update> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
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Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
 
Ineffective execution of <uninstall> using <Microsoft SQL server 2008> by <Administrator> 
Countermeasures 
Canonicalization : Only accept primitive typed identified (e.g., integers) which are mapped to filenames 
HTTP Replay Attack : Provide a secure end-to-end communication channel between server and client (e.g., 
SSL) 
One-Click Attack : Make the request that encapsulates the users action unique for each authenticated user 
Repudiation Attack : Implement proper and effective logging 
Response Splitting : Perform context-sensitive encoding 
Session Hijacking : Use strong random numbers for session IDs 
SQL Injection : Use parameterized SQL statement 
SQL Injection : Use stored procedure with no dynamic SQL 
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